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This study examines the continuities and changes in the security policies of the newly
reunified Germany, providing background for American policy makers and strategists
concerned with questions about Germany's future. Germany's actions in the year and a half
since unification have been less than reassuring for American statesmen. In the GulfWar,
Germany refused to participate militarily in the American led coalition on constitutional
grounds. Then in December of 1991, Germany refused to go along with the policies of the
United States and its major European allies in linking recognition of Yugoslavian republics
to an overall setdement of the civil war in that country. In pursuing these initiatives,
Germany demonstrated that it no longer occupied the position of junior partner to the
United States in the foreign policy field and that it had national security policies of its
own to pursue which were sometimes more European than Atlantic oriented. This attitude
unjustifiably alarmed many American and European statesmen who had grown
comfortable with the passive policies of the West German government and the constraints
that the cold war had built into the European security system. The year 1989 marked the
end of the cold war and forces Germany to contend with global responsibilities and in-
fluence that it has not had to contend with since 1945 using the political culture that it has
evolved in that time. This study covers the historical development of the present
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Chapter I : introduction
Will the United Germany become a world power? Since the iron curtain across
central Europe crumbled, Germany, Europe, and the world have undergone fundamental
changes. The bipolar world has vanished as swiftly as did the Berlin wall, and with it the
division of Germany which was the symbol of the cold war. Germany is now united for
the first time since Potsdam in 1945, and is surrounded by neighbors to the west with
whom it is deeply integrated, to the east by a revitalized and unstable central and south-
central Europe.
The United States stood at the forefront of Germany's allies when it came time to
reunite the nation. It was all the US could do for its staunchest continental ally of the cold
war, a country with which it shared common values and interests, a country it had helped
build from the shattered remains of the Third Reich.
But with the swift changes in global power since German unification, European and
American political elites believe that Germany is abandoning its subsidiary role to the
United States. With the loss of control which accompanied the end of the cold war and the
signing of the two plus four treaty in 1990 , visions of the old Germany arise whenever
Germany follows a different policy than which its allies expect of it. Since the new
Germany does not neatly fit into the submissive paradigm of the West German
government in following US foreign policy leads, then the paradigms of Wilhelmine and
Nazi Germany are innocuously substituted in their place.
Today's Germany is of course not the Third Reich; it stands at the opposite end of the
moral spectrum. But by the same token, today's Germany is not the old West German
Republic ala 1967 and cannot be expected to act as such. Germany today lies in the center
1
of Europe, a bridge berween East and West, between the economies of a rich West and an
impoverished East, and between the ideals of liberal democracy and self determination
and the past ghosts of totalitarianism and communism. Germany is deeply integrated into
Europe and the course that it elects to take will necessarily be a large influence on the
course of Europe.
American policy elites must develop a new paradigm for Germany if they are to
successfully work with their German friends without the hysterical abuse of Third Reich
cliches whenever Germany acts out of character of the last forty-five years. It will not be
an easy task since the Germans themselves have yet to fully come to terms with the
implications of unification on their global responsibilities. But it is sure to be a different
approach to world security than that embraced by the United States, and this should not be
cause for undue alarm. It is the twofold purpose of this paper to present the historical
context of the present German security policies and to examine current changes in German
policies which have alarmed US statesmen.
Thesis
Choosing the wrong paradigm when discussing Germany not only demonstrates a lack
of comprehension of what has occurred over the last forty-five years, but for an American
policy maker or strategist can be outright dangerous. The thesis of this paper suggests that
the German historical legacy and political/social development over the last forty-five
years has conspired to make powerpolitics unattractive to both the German people and
their democratic government. Liberal democracy, humanitarianism, and individual rights
are values which are not alien to Germany; they were evident in 1848. But these values have
now had the opportunity to be nurtured and developed free of subversion, and they are now
deeply imbedded morally and institutionally in German life.
Neither the Wilhelmine, Third Reich, or old West German Republic paradigm will
do for the Germany today. Cliches and historical generalizations must be set aside in
studying where the German political culture came from and what it is doing. Much of it
will form a subtle continuity with the recent past, with the morality and world view of
present statesmen, but the changes are always highlighted and possibly open to comparison
to narrow portions of discredited paradigms of the past.
In making the above argument for the most likely continuity in German statecraft, the
hypothesis that the period of the West German Federal Republic, 1949-1990, is a
discontinuity in German statecraft is rejected. By this argument, the use of Machtpolitik
(powerpolitics) as an instrument of statecraft was not a possibility due to the situation
Germany found herself in after the war: conquered, divided and separated into the camps
of the two superpowers. Germany very pragmatically played the role that allowed it to re-
legitimize itself in the security of the Atlantic alliance, rearm, and eventually reunify.
While current German politicians are sincere in their professions of peaceful coexistence
and cooperative structures, a breakdown in these structures or an economic downturn could
easily bring out the suppressed German political character of old and a return to
Machpolitik. Could economic conditions recalling those of 1930-1932 lead to similar
results in the political/social realm?
DEVELOPMENT
The development of German statecraft in the period following the end of the Second
World War will be analyzed in the first chapter. The policies that led to the integration in
the West, political and economic rehabilitation, and rearmament will be detailed to
illustrate the extent of the reaction by German statesmen, notably the chancellor Dr.
Konrad Adenauer, to the political extremes of their predecessors.
Adenauer early on won the confidence of the victorious allies and established the
German political precedent of not only alliance with, but full integration with the liberal
democracies of the West. He created a morally respectable army, the Bundeswehr, and
completed Germany's entry into NATO.
Adenauer's integration in the West was balanced by Willy Brandt's Eastern policies
which eased tensions between East and West during the period 1966-1974. Brandt's
Ostpolitik allowed contacts to develop not only between the two Germanies, but with all
of Eastern Europe as well.
The second chapter examines the sources of change in Germany. Some of these are
real, some perceived, but all give rise to apprehension among Germany's allies and
neighbors about her future role in Europe. Of particular interest in light of the
powerpolitics of the past is the German position on the use of force and out of area
operations. Also of concern are Germany's renewed ties to the East and the perceived
impact of unification on German options.
The third chapter is a case study of the German initiatives during the Yugoslavian
crisis. For the first time in its history, the Federal Republic took the initiative in a major
foreign policy step to recognize the independent states of Croatia and Slovenia. This was
remarkable not just because it was a German initiative, but because it was opposed by all
of Germany's major partners and caused a great deal of consternation in London and
Washington.
The conclusion suggests that while Germany will continue in its historical role as a
revisionist power, this revision is limited to specific integral and legitimate security
interests of the German state. The powerpolitics and territorial revision which
characterized previous German statecraft in the period 1870-1945 are not present in
German statecraft or in the mainstream political circles. The synthesis of the two familiar
paradigms of Germany results in a Germany which though tightly integrated into the West,
nevertheless is not led by such institutions as in the past, but is actively involved in
influencing them for legitimate German and European security interests. American
statesmen need to understand this synthesis lest they become alarmed at possible future
high profile German developments, such as the attainment of a permanent seat on the
United Nations Security Council, the deployment of Bundeswehr troops under United
Nations mandate, or a German lead in foreign policy which runs counter to what the
United States wants or expects.
This conclusion does not mean that American strategists and policy makers should
accept all that Germany does at face value. As Germany grows more confident in its role
as world power, there will undoubtedly be more room for conflict with the United States,
especially in cases involving the justification for military intervention. The close
relationship developed between these two countries does demand that an understanding of
the national interests and prerogatives of each of these two partners be reexamined and
understood to avoid unnecessary conflicts in the future.
Sources
For development of the German position and perspective, government documents and
publications from the strategic and foreign policy elites are used. Speeches by German
statesmen are found in such publications as the Bulletin of the German Bundestag,
Statements and Speeches of the German Information Center, press releases from the
German embassy, and Sicherheitspolitik of the Defense Ministry. Detailed perspectives
and policy options are found in government and private journals such as Aufienpolitik, Aus
Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Beitrage zur Konflictsforschung, and Deutschland Archiv. The
German elite press provides the editorial and time sensitive sources, in newspapers such as
Die Zeit, the Frankfurter Allgemeine, and the German Tribune, and also in journals and
magazines such as Frieden und Abriistung, Der Spiegel and the Frankfurt Peace Research
Institute. American and British sources are used for development of most of the historical
perspective in the following chapter and as a counterweight to the perspective of the
German sources.
Chapter II : development of post-War policies
The defeat of the Third Reich in 1945 brought to an end Germany's reliance on power
politics in its international relations. It is a testament to the barbarity of the war and the
absoluteness of defeat in war that Germany renounced the use of force in its relations with
other nations, and alone among the major Western countries maintained this position over
the past four decades. In that time, German policy has been implemented in terms of
cooperative security structures and collective defense. In the West, this policy has
manifested itself up to the present time in the tight integration of the West German state
into the Atlantic Alliance in almost all respects. In the East, this policy took the form of
rapprochement and cooperation in the 1970's, when shared values were not a common
element in Germany's eastern relations. The renunciation of force has come full circle,
however. To the present time, the use of force even under the auspices of a multinational
mandate still presents Germany with a national dilemma which it has yet to come to
terms with. The reluctance to exercise the responsibility that Germany's position entails
caused tensions in US/German relations, leading to acrimonious feelings on both sides of
the Atlantic. 1
This dilemma is not entirely of Germany's own making. From its inception in 1949,
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) has been severely restrained in its security
' Giinther Gillessen, "Washington Is Riled by Germany's Reluctance to Pull its Weight in World
Affairs", transl. from Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . in The German Tribune . 6 June, 1991.
policies, which in turn reflected the greater strains of the superpower conflict which was the
causal reason for the foundation of the FRG to begin with. West Germany lacked the
political, legal, and moral capacity to determine its own policies from its founding in
1949 through 1957. But even as it gained in influence in its own internal affairs, the
external constraints remained tight and severely restrained any alternatives that the Federal
Republic might have wished to pursue. The Federal Republics very existence was brought
about by the inability of the superpowers to jointly administer a vanquished Germany and
made it both object and pivot of the cold war confrontation. 2
This section examines the causes and means of the transformation of German foreign
policy in this light. The main issues facing German politicians in the period after the end
of the war were regaining political legitimacy, reunification of the various occupation
zones, the orientation of the future German state, economic recovery, sovereignty, and
several years later, rearmament as well. The choices that could possibly have been pursued
followed three general orientations: alignment with the East, alignment with the West, or
establishment of a neutral Germany with security guaranteed by its neighbors.
The first case would not have been allowed by the United States or would have had to
assume a complete American withdrawal from Europe. The second case would have been
opposed by the Soviet Union, while the third option would have provided a continuum of
the old German see-saw politics which had led to disaster two times previously in the 20th
century. The Christian Democratic Union (CDU), under the able leadership of Konrad
Adenauer, undertook the second option. The newly formed Federal Republic of Germany
2 Wolfram Hanrieder, Germany, America, Europe: Forty Years of German Foreign Policy . Yale
University Press: New Haven and London, 1989, 15.
(FRG) would be integrated into the "Western security system despite the objections of the
Soviet Union. During various negotiations, the Soviets had envisioned a weak, neutral, and
demilitarized collection of "rump" states as the replacement for the German Reich. 3
Western integration assured the division of Germany while obtaining security, sovereignty,
and economic and political rehabilitation for West Germany. The tensions of the cold
war were thus geographically as well as ideologically defined. It was not until the Social
Democratic Party (SPD) of Willy Brandt offered rapproachment with the East in the
spirit of "detente" of the early 1970's that these tensions were eased and the traditional
German ties to the East were significantly improved.
Development under Adenauer
The first foreign policy phase of the new Federal Republic was the most constrained
by outside forces, yet at the same time, these outside forces had not coalesced to the point
where the constraints they imposed became rigid. This period is strongly identified with
the German chancellor at the time, Konrad Adenauer, who served as head of the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) from 1949 to 1963- 4 Adenauer's historical experience and
political sense led him to reject all options which would have led to a return of
Schaukelpolitik (see-saw politics - a neutral position wherein the East and the West were
played off against one another) or Machtpolitik (power politics-revisionism by use of
^William Hyland, The Soviet Union and Germany .in West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979 . ed. W.
Hanrieder, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1980, 112.
4 Joseph Joffe, The View from Bonn , in Eroding Empire , ed Lincoln Gordon, The Brookings Institute:
Washington, DC, 1987, 140.
force) of previous regimes. He believed that a political revision of the results of the
Second World War were possible, but that Germany would first have to legitimize itself
in the West before pursuing revisionism and reunification policies in the East. He therefore
firmly committed West Germany to integration in the West. This goal of legitimization
and the subsequent attainment of sovereignty, along with economic and political
reconstruction and reunification, provided a continuity in German post-war politics over
the next four decades. 5
Redefining Security
Adenauer understood that the instabilities of the previous regimes were rooted in
the tenuous German Mittellage (geostrategic middle position of Europe). This Mittellage
had been at the root of the German problem since at least the founding of the Second Reich
in 1871, and to a lesser extent before this event. 6 In an abrupt change from the past,
Adenauer chose alliance with the West as the best course for Germany.7
Integration was the indispensable first step toward gaining the trust and leeway
with the Western allies that would be necessary for sovereignty. Eventual sovereignty was
^ Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer's Ostpolitik, in West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979 . ed. W.
Hanrieder, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1980, 133.
° David Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered . Cambridge University Press: New York,
1978,5,6. The German problem can be traced back at least to the 17* century, when the Habsburg Holy
Roman Emperor Ferdinad II attempted unsuccessfully to unite the German states.
' As Hanrieder points out, this could be cynically viewed as making virtue of necessity, as the United
States would not have allowed any course which led to the East, but Adenauer's convictions were with him in
this decision.
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hardly a foregone conclusion after the war, and intense, sincere, and permanent steps were
required to assure allied cooperation toward his goals. 8
Integration in the West would not only produce security for Germany from the
Soviets, but also would protect Germans from themselves. Adenauer was an ardent anti-
nationalist who distrusted the German sense of proportion that had failed them so often in
the past. 9 He envisioned a strong security regime contained in the West to build up the
liberal democratic traditions which had eluded Germany in the 1840's, 1870's, and in the
Weimar years. He thus saw the security role for Germany as a complementary one to the
double containment role of the United States. By 1950, the United States had established
the containment doctrine to hold the Soviets to their the current political positions. But a
secondary US policy was to assure that Germany remained contained and in the Western
camp, and to reassure both the Germans and the other Western Allies ofUS support. 10
While western integration was an end in itself for Adenauer, it was also the necessary
groundwork for the further development of the FRG.
Economic and Political Reconstruction
Along with the security integration, Adenauer sought a political and economic
reconstruction in both a European and and Adanticist context. Solid economic policies
" Hyland, 111-113. Various schemes were proposed by both Soviets and the West. Stalin envisioned
a dismembered Germany of several rump states, such as a separate Rhineland and Bavaria, with transfer of
territory to Poland. The Morganthau plan called for an agrarian state stripped of its industry and left in a
very weakened state. Almost all plans foresaw a weak Germany, and only the advent of the east west conflict
allowed the establishment of the two powerful German states of the post war period.
y Gert Krell, "Ostpolitik Dimensions of West German Security Policy", Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt . No 1, 13.
10 Hanrieder, 30-32.
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were a political mandate for a nation suffering the deprivations of the war, and Adenauer's
close ties and support for the West gave the CDU the credibility that economic
restructuring would accompany the western integration. This platform more than anything
else ensured the surprising prominence of the CDU in the first elections of the Federal
Republic in 1949. The SPD had placed greater priority on reunification than on
integration, and thus had pursued the traditional German approach as a neutral state in the
middle of Europe. 11 Their platform was idealistic and offered vague goals for the future,
but the electorate opted for concrete results of political and economic reconstruction with
the West.
As the FRG turned ever more to the West, issues of sovereignty and equality
became less of an issue, at least for the United States and Britain. 12 But the Allies needed
integrative structures that would bind the Germans to the West:
To check the Germans, formal international conventions became a necessity. The
fear (especially in Paris) that Germany's political and economic recovery might
proceed along national lines, unencumbered by international constraints, made
integrative arrangements seem imperative. At least they would help control
Germany's resurgence...The creation of an integrated postwar Europe provided the
framework for Germany's reconstruction. The European Community, the FRG —
and NATO — were made for one another. 13
1
1
Volker Rittberger, "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland - eine Weltmacht? Aufienpolitik nach vierzig
lahren". Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte . 15 Jan 1990, 5.




The first step in this economic integration was the formation of the European
Coal and Steel Community and Germany's membership on equal terms, as outlined in the
1952 Bonn Conventions. This community later expanded to cover other economic matters
and became the European Community in 1957. 14
The issues of political reconstruction and sovereignty became linked to German
rearmament in face of the growing Soviet menace. The issue of German rearmament had
been explored by the Americans in the late 1940s as a way to get large numbers of troops
onto the front lines in the tense period that had developed since the end of the war. 15
French and British commitments to the Brussels Pact were undermined by their colonial
ambitions and strained economic capacity. Even America was strained following the
outbreak of the Korean War. 16 However, American politicians were mindful of the fact
that the rearmament proposals would evoke adverse public reaction by both the American
and French publics. In fact, when Adenauer first broached the subject in an interview with
the C leveland Plain Dealer in 1949, the outcry against German rearmament was shrill and
the allied high commissioner responded with a declaration against militarism. 17
Although Adenauer's wish to see the establishment of a defense force for Germany




> Mathias Bartke, 31.
'"Douglas Stuart and William Tow, The Limits of Alliance: NATO out-of-area problems since
1949 . The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1991, 266.
Mathias Bartke, Verteidigungsauftrag der Bundeswehr . Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991, 31.
13
the allied need for German rearmament based on their inability to protect not only
Germany, but the whole of continental Europe. Indeed, he was not far off the mark. Initial
allied war plans in 1949/early 1950 called for the evacuation of American troops to
Britain, to be followed by an eventual return after heavy aerial bombardment. 18 The
turning point in this issue was the outbreak of war in Korea. 19 The Americans perceived
this as the much feared opening salvo of the global onslaught of communism, which would
also distract American attention and force from the real target, Europe. The Americans
quickly let the denazification, demilitarization, and decartelization campaign fall by the
wayside, and agreed in principle to the "sovereignty for rearmament" formula the
following year. 20 From this point on, eventual rearmament was a given, but the mechanism
for German military force integration and sovereignty still had to be negotiated.
The French minister-president Pleven suggested formation of the European
Defense Community (EDC), which would constitute a European army of multinational
units answerable to a European Parliament. All German troops would be subordinate to
this army, while other countries would need only contribute a portion of their forces to the
EDC. The basic French premise was to remilitarize the FRG without rearming it and to
call German soldiers to service without forming a German army. These provisoes, along







with other structural and legal provisions cementing the inequality of Germany, was
unacceptable to Adenauer, although its all-European integrative aspect appealed to him. 21
Adenauer had to balance between the Americans and French interests in the
alliance. The French were concerned about basic balance of power inequities on the
continent, while the US wished to integrate Germany and rearm it quickly. Eventually, an
EDC framework was worked out which was acceptable to Adenauer. It allowed the
formation of a German army and a German Defense Ministry, but it would be under EDC
command. The premise of establishing a Bundeswehr was challenged by the SPD in court,
but after the elections of 6 September 1953, the CDU coalition government had the two-
thirds majority that was necessary for a change in the basic law to allow formation of the
armed forces. This first Basic Law change was passed in March 1954 in order to
accommodate accession to the EDC. But in a stunning move, the French national assembly
rejected the EDC some five months later. 22
This act by the French, who had initially proposed the EDC to begin with,
effectively isolated them from their allies. An alternate framework using the Western
European Union and NATO was devised by the other allies in the Paris Agreements of
1954.23
In Germany, the rearmament for sovereignty issue was very divisive, eliciting






party. But Adenauer forged ahead and concluded the Paris Agreements, which led to
sovereignty on May 5, 1955. 24 While he realized that the actual limits of Germany's
sovereignty would be immediately frozen in place by the realities of the east-west conflict
and previous German commitments, the way was cleared for the FRG to conduct foreign
policy as a legitimate and moral member of the international community. The confluence
of choice and necessity in economic and political reconstruction ensured their success, but
by the same token they deepened the rift between east and west and made the third goal
unattainable for Adenauer. 25
Reunification
Adenauer's third goal was the reunification of the three parts of Germany, but here
the first two goals became mutually exclusive with the third, or so it appeared for the next
four decades. Having defeated Germany after an unprovoked attack and near annihilation
in the war, the Soviets were justifiably reluctant to see a reunified Germany arise which was
not under their control. At the same time, though, they did not wish to see West Germany
firmly integrated into the west and rearmed as well. They protested the movements
towards rearmament, and held out the hope that reunification could be discussed as long as
West Germany did not commit itself to the West. They therefore pursued a policy which
promised flexibility while West Germany was still in the process of forming these ties
and negotiating rearmament issues. Once these issues were resolved, however, the Soviet
position became more entrenched and static. There was probably never really a time when
^ F. Roy Willis, Germany. France Europe , in West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979 . ed. W.
Hanrieder, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1980, 98-99.
^^ Hanrieder, 7.
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the Soviets and Americans would have agreed on a reunification plan because it was a zero
sum game. If one side of the cold war blocs considered it an advantage to reunify, then the
other side would have to have had a disadvantage from this proposal.
A pillar of Adenauer's reunification policy was the claim, enshrined in Article 23
of the German Basic Law, that the West German government, as a true liberal democracy,
was the sole representative of the interests of all Germans in the four parts of Germany: the
FRG, the Soviet zone (GDR), Berlin, and the former German lands to the east of the
Oder-Neisse line. This legal argument was necessary so that when the time for
reunification came, the lands to the east could be absorbed as additional Lander, as indeed
happened, instead of the merging together of two states.
The manifestation of this policy was the Hallstein Doctrine. The West German
government would withhold or withdraw diplomatic recognition to any country, with the
exception of the Soviet Union, that recognized the German Democratic Republic (GDR).
This doctrine was conceived in 1955 after relations were established with the Soviet Union
in order to deny legitimacy to East European countries, and remained in effect until
1967. 26
Adenauer believed that reunification through a policy of strength was the only
alternative. In the United States, he perceived a hegemonic power that would only grow
stronger in time, and which supported his goal of reunification. But by joining the west,
the lines of demarcation between east and west, which might have remained blurred
without this commitment, were clearly drawn. The Soviets were not inclined to cede
^" J.F. Brown, Eastern Europe's' Western Concern , in Eroding Empires . The Brookings Institution:
Washington, D.C.,1987, 43.
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additional territory to the anti-Soviet coalition. At the time and for the next several
decades, the reunification policy of Adenauer appeared not only ineffective, but lacking in
realism and rationality.27 It was only after an expanse of time greater than he had ever
envisioned, that his policies were vindicated and German reunification occurred from a
position of great economic strength over the Soviet Union.
Significance of Adenauer's Policies
Adenauer's integration plan was a decisive break with the past. For the first time in
modern history, Germany (West) had finally made the hard decision that had been at the
root of the German problem for the past century. During Bismarcks unification drive and
beyond, united Germany had never been able to reconcile its central position in Europe
decisively to ally itself with either the east or the west, resulting in the Shaukelpolitik of
previous regimes. Its security had never been assured in a cooperative context, and
alliances were subject to any political expediency of the time. During the period of
German unification, an Austrian alliance was concluded against Denmark and Great Britain
in Schleswig-Holstein, French benign neutrality was arranged to allow the Austro-Prussian
war of 1866, and Austrian benign neutrality was likewise obtained for Prussia to pursue the
Franco-Prussian war in 1870-71. Despite attempts to ally itself with either Russia or
Great Britain, Germany still ended up fighting two disastrous two-front world wars.
With Adenauer, Germany had finally made the move to the Atlanticist West and to a
less continental role. The decision linking unity and freedom under a liberal democratic
^' Krell, "Ostpolitik Dimensions...", 13-15.
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guise demonstrated that the goal was not just the restoration of a national state in
Germany, but the establishment of a higher order of European unity. 28 The ties forged
were much more than just political or military, they were economical, ideological,
cultural, and visibly affected the whole ofWest Germany. The FRG not only moved to
the West and assimilated western cultural and ethical values, but also made fundamental
concessions on sovereignty and freedom of action which Adenauer considered "intrinsically
unobjectionable" 29 They were even less objectionable in light of the overall diminution of
European influence in the larger context of the global confrontations taking place. By
1955, the FRG was a semi-sovereign nation, the Bundeswehr plans were being finalized30 ,
and the policy of double containment had been affected. The Soviet influence in the West
had been stymied, West Germany was integrated into the West, and the American policy
of massive retaliation ensured the viability of the Atlantic Alliance.
Transition
This cohesion was short lived and early on showed signs of new strains. The
acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Soviet Union combined with their ability to deliver
them to the continental Unites States by 1956 31 made the nuclear guarantees of the United
" Winfried Becker, "Die Haltung der Parteien zur Deutschen Frage 1945 bis 1990", Zeitschrift zur
politischen Bildung und Information . 2nd Quarter, 1990, 30.
" Hanrieder, 6.
30 Ibid., 17.
3' Honore M. Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev , (Humanities Press
International, Inc.:Atlanric Highlands, NJ.1988, 46,47 The first delivery vehicles were the TU-20 Bear and
Mya-4 Bison longrange bomber. ICBM's were test flown in 1957 and deployed in 1961.
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States less credible. The French, in particular, questioned the credibility of an American
nuclear response to a conventional invasion of Europe. Would this would mean that
American cities would be destroyed as well by Soviet nuclear weapons?32 West Germany
was placed in the awkward position of having to choose between Paris and Washington on a
much more frequent basis over divisive issues. At the heart of the matter was the
incongruity of the goals of both the United States and France.
The French were interested in lessening the influence of the superpowers in Europe as
well as maintaining the illusion of French global influence, while the United States desired
a strong European presence to contain the Soviets and reassure allies. French president De
Gaulle sought European support for his global ambitions, while the Germans required
French support for their Eastern policies. It was a political/military tradeoff with
Germany forging economic ties with France for political reasons, and France forging
political ties with Germany for economic reasons. 33 The French offered support only in so
far as the easing of tensions and the end to the cold war could lead to the withdrawal of US
and Soviet forces from Europe, leaving France as the preeminent European power. 34
The United States in turn fell into the comfort of the status quo in Europe as it
became apparent that the cold war blocs had solidified their positions there and that
attention had shifted to the third world. Although Washington still formally supported
32 Kaplan, 42.
33 Hanrieder, 14.
^4 Jan Reifenberg, Germany and the Atlantic Community , in West German Foreign Policy 1949-
1979 . ed. W. Hanrieder, Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 1980, 64-65.
20
West German policies in the East, this support was only halfhearted and reflected US
acceptance of the Soviet position.
Neither of these policies was beneficial to Germany, and the divergence of these
interests became ever more problematic. At the heart of the problem was the inability of
Germany to reconcile both political and legal aspects of its policy on reunification.
German Ostpolitik was stale and lacked innovation, as it was premised on assumptions
that did not mesh well with the realities of the situation. By the mid 1960s, France's
dynamic overtures in the capitals of eastern Europe threatened to isolate Germany
diplomatically and make France the spokesman of Western Europe in the East. By the
same token, Washington's policies were inherently conservative.
The basis of the FRGY problems was something of a paradox. West Germany sought
a policy which could lead to unification, but refused to recognize the need to negotiate
with satellite countries, since this would harm its position vis-a-vis the German
Democratic Republic (GDR). This meant that no negotiations on reunification could take
place, since the starting point for the Soviets was the legitimization of their sphere of
influence through recognition by the West. A lesser paradox arose whenever the other allies
brought up arms control with the Soviets. While desiring arms control, the FRG was also
apprehensive of any new measures that could lead to a change for the worse concerning the
position of West Germany. There was always the possibility that the wartime victors
might settle their grievances at the expense of the FRG.
By the end of the 1960s, the congruence of German and US policies had all but
disappeared. As opposed to the two mutually exclusive but inherendy unobjectionable
options of the 1950s which provided a comprehensive Westpolitik and a possible
Ostpolitik, the alternatives offered in the 1 960s by Washington and Paris were all
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objectionable to the German government. The tortured West German legal position vis a
vis the East only aggravated this already unpleasant position.
The New Ostpolitik
The successful integration of West Germany into the Western alliance and its
economic and political reconstruction were phenomenally successful, but the assumptions
made by Adenauer as to how this would lead to better relations with the East and eventual
reunification did not play true. Contrary to his expectations, the West had not become
stronger in relation to the East, and the very success of Adenauer's Westpolitik doomed his
Ostpolitik to failure.
It is paradoxical that the source of continued German division, the cold war, also gave
West Germany the political power to make territorial claims extending to the borders of
the Reich of 1937. 35 The legal framework constructed by West Germany in the 1950s and
1960s to support this basis of its Ostpolitik was in itself divisive and prevented further
rapprochement with the East. By the end of the 1960s, continued German claims for a
unified Germany offered nothing that the Soviets could or wanted to support. The Soviets
at that time sought recognition of the legitimacy of the status quo bloc it had established
in Europe, and recognition of parity with the United States as a superpower. The greater




The altered relationship between global security and the German national question led
to a more conciliatory attitude upon election of an SPD-led government in 1969. The
policy of applying pressure on the Soviets from a position of strength had failed, and the
Soviet unwillingness to accept change which was not of their own making became apparent
in Prague in the spring of 1968. Willy Brandt, the SPD's chancellor, sought to revitalize
the relations with the East by discarding much of the tortured legalistic rhetoric of the past
twenty years and by recognizing the status quo in eastern Europe. Bonn had held the key to
detente in Europe for years, but had resisted the paradox that the only way to overcome the
realities of division was to first accept them. 37 The Soviets were very receptive to these
new overtures in German Ostpolitik, for it presented them with the long sought after
legitimization of their sphere of influence in Europe.
The new Ostpolitik was based upon the premise of several factors. The refusal to
recognize the loss of the eastern third of Germany to Poland did not make this fact any
less revocable, and left German statesmen open to charges of revanchism from the East.
The Hallstein Doctrine hindered relations not just in the East, but was becoming more
difficult to support in the West as well, and was in fact on the verge of collapse. A third
assumption was that a policy of reconciliation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
could open these countries and improve the position of the FRG. These measures would
increase the visibility and influence of Germany in Eastern Europe, and the glaring
37 Krell, 21.
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inequities between Marxism and Social Democracy would then become evident and
develop the mechanism of change.38
The 1970 White Paper, promulgated by the Defense Ministerium, spells out the
assumptions of the new Ostpolitik clearly. First of all, it recognized that nothing of
importance could be done in the East without Moscow's approval. Second, the
administrations in Prague, East Berlin, Warsaw, and the other East European capitals were
recognized as sovereign with their own will and weight. Third, it would be foolish,
dangerous, and irresponsible policy to attempt to drive wedges between the countries of
the Warsaw Pact. 39
Brandt's Ostpolitik manifested itself in a series of bilateral treaties negotiated
between the FRG and various east bloc countries between 1970 and 1973. The treaty which
paved the way for consultations with the Soviet satellites was the Moscow Treaty of
August 12, 1970.40 The FRG acknowledged the territorial consequences of the Second
World War and renounced the use of violence in their relations with other countries. While
the renunciation of force was not new for the FRG, this had never before been negotiated
with the observance of state boundaries. With this treaty signed, the FRG had the implied
consent of the Soviet Union to negotiate with the other East European countries. 41
Jy Martin Hillenbrand, The United States and Germany, in West German Foreign Policy 1949-1979 .
ed. W. Hanrieder, Wesrview Press: Boulder, CO, 1980, 82-83.
39 Weiftbuch 1970, Zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr .




The treaty recognizing the annexation of the lands to the east of the Oder- Neisse line
and establishing full relations with Germany was concluded with Poland in December of
1970.42 While discussions with the GDR had become deadlocked, the 1971
Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin between the six powers in Berlin moved ahead and
eventually opened the door to conclude the GDR treaty. The Quadripartite Agreement
recognized West Berlin as an integral part of the FRG, but prohibited the FRG from
conducting constitutional or presidential activity in West Berlin. In addition, access
matters relating to West Berlin were resolved, and limited visitation of West Berliners
with the surrounding countryside were negotiated.
This agreement opened the way for the Treaty between the two German states in
1972, the pinnacle of Brandt's Ostpolitik. The negotiations had been ongoing since 1969,
but while the FRG was willing to now cede many major points, they stopped just short of
many East German demands, most significantly the recognition of the GDR as a fully
separate state from the FRG.
The FRG surrendered positions in light of the unchanging reality of the situation in
East Germany: they recognized the state of the GDR, renounced claims to sole
representation of all Germany, treated the inner German border as a legitimate political






But Bonn held back on full recognition of the GDR under international law and instead
insisted on maintaining the special relationship between the two equal Germanies. The
FRG held that the two German states constituted one German nation, and as such had a
special relationship to one another.44 Issues of true sovereignty were not resolved. This
was demonstrated by the exchange not of ambassadors, but of permanent representatives to
each others capitals.
The last treaty signed as part of Brandt's Ostpolitik was the German Czech Treaty in
May of 1973. This treaty renounced the terms of the 1938 Munich Agreement. Like other
treaties with the eastern European countries, the FRG recognized the borders of
Czechoslovakia and renounced the use of force in its dealings with other nations. This
treaty also allowed Bonn to normalize relations with Hungary and Bulgaria. These two
countries had insisted that Bonn resolve the issues with Czechoslovakia first.
Upon conclusion of the German-Czech treaty, the intensive period of Willy Brandt's
Ostpolitik came to an end, and he would resign the next year due to an unrelated matter.45
The Soviet Union had gained the legitimacy it had sought for its conquests and had at last
gained diplomatic as well as strategic parity with the United States. The Soviets now no
longer had the incentives to push for further agreements in inter-German relations, as these
were considered potentially destabilizing to the cohesion of the Warsaw Pact.46
44 Krell, 20.
45 Jacob Heilbrunn, "Germany and the Cold War: An Inquest", Global Affairs . Spring 1991, 86.
46 Hanrieder, 209.
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Significance of Brandt's Ostpolitik
Effective German policies to the East had been significantly stalled for several
decades while West Germany struggled with the results of the Second World War.
Brandt's policies were effective because he redefined the relationship between the security
interests of the FRG and the national question in terms that were acceptable to the East.
Western integration having been accomplished, albeit with rifts arising between various
western nations, the SPD's corollary achievement was the renunciation of German
revisionism in the East. Just as fears of a resurgent Germany were allayed by western
integration, so too were eastern fears of German revisionism allayed by Brandt's policy of
recognizing the status quo in Eastern Europe.47
The more immediate result of Brandt's policies was that Germany removed itself
from the political isolation of the 1960s and moved to the forefront of detente. German
influence in detente proceedings increased by the much broader base that its predominantly
successful Ostpolitik allowed. By the same token, French influence in the East was
diminished by West Germany's Ostpolitik, for the Soviet Union was content with the
recognition accorded Eastern Europe and with the maintenance of the status quo, whereas
French support had hinged on superpower withdrawal from Europe.
The treaty governing the FRG and the GDR laid the groundwork for relations which
would eventually undermine the latter and made reunification possible. The GDR traded
47 Heilbrunn, 82.
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Chapter III: Sources of Change
The famed specter that once stalked the capitals of Europe has now vanished into the
wreckage of 1989-1991, but in a recent article in Global Affairs Soviet analyst Marion
Leighton raised the new and to her very real specter of a new German-Soviet/now-Russian
pact that will share the master bedroom in the "Common European Home" which
Secretary Gorbachev had proposed to build on the cheap real estate of Eastern Europe.49
Her concerns are indicative of the uncertainty, foreboding, and misunderstanding many
Americans feel toward the recent developments in Europe. The concern that the German
political character and foreign policy of pre FRG regimes will reappear over the next few
decades rests on the grounds that Germany is now less constrained than at any time since
the end of the Second World War in her options and abilities to act on the global scene.
The adversarial forces that kept Germany contained into separate states in a bipolar global
structure have all but disappeared, and the international order is in a state of transition in
which roles have great leeway for definition. For the sceptics of Germany's current
political philosophy of cooperative coexistence and continuing integration, it must be
determined what the root cause of their fears are. Have the Germans been merely playing
along for the past forty-five years until they were sufficiently recovered to try again? Do
Germans really identify with the power politics of the past, or do they eschew force? This
4y Marion Leighton, "Toward a 'Common European Home': What's in it for Us?", Global Affairs ,
Spring Quarter 1991, 77-84.
29
chapter will cover the issues that have influenced American perceptions over the last two
years and which could serve as a source for the apprehension of Germany's erstwhile allies.
The most visible, hence obvious, event which could be a source for change in direction
of the German state is the reunification of 1990, brought about by the easing of East-West
tensions since 1985. The three goals of postwar Germany as laid out by Adenauer and
pursued by his successors have now been achieved, and an era is over. Germany is a liberal
democratic, sovereign state deeply imbedded in the West, it is a great economic power,
and it is now also unified, although in only two of the three parts of the former Reich which
Adenauer knew. 50 With its major foreign policy goals of the last forty-five years
accomplished, does this mean that Germany stands in the same position as it did in 1871,
1919, or 1937? Will Germany now attempt to become a European hegemon using
different means than the force used in the period 1864-1945?
Another source of change is Germany's gready expanded role in the East. Wilfried
von Bredow makes the argument that further western integration and eastern cooperation,
the principles of Adenauer and Brandt respectively, must be the basis of German foreign
policy, in that order. Short term decisions regarding some sort of collective security in
with the East and the economic foundations of such a system with the eastern Europeans
would necessarily divert material resources and attention away from the above listed
priorities and bind German security too closely with the unstable developments in the
^0 Roughly onethird of the 1937 German Reich, including Prussia, East Prussia, Silesia, and east
Pomerania, was transferred to Poland at Potsdam as compensation for the loss of Poland's eastern territories
to the Soviet Union.
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former Soviet Union. 51 Yet at the same time Germany has developed unique bilateral ties
to the countries of Eastern Europe. Are there signs that these ties will be Europeanized as
Germany itself strives towards EC union, or will these ties remain uniquely German and
hence divert German political energy away from the EC?
What about Out of Area military operations? The Bundeswehr is being restructured
and reorientated to reflect the many changed circumstances of the security needs of Europe.
Germany for the first time in modern history is not faced with direct military threats
along its borders, but at the same time the developing awareness that Germany as a global
economic power has responsibilities and interests to protect outside of Germany infer a
greater political/military role in the area outside of the present day NATO. What are
German attitudes towards military force and the out of area issue?
UNIFICATION
When German unification became a very real possibility after the GDR opened its
borders with the west in November of 1989, the possibilities for reunification of the two
German states were tempered by real and imagined obstacles envisioned by politicians
and informed public alike. The complete and utter collapse of not only the regime of the
GDR, but of all countries of eastern Europe was not anticipated quite so suddenly. When
the momentum of change and the direction of events seemed to make reunification
possible after all, many statesmen of other countries and the elite press seemed to argue for
a slowdown of the rush to reunification. Margaret Thatcher cautioned for a slow approach
Wilfried von Bredow and Thomas Jager, "Die Aufienpolitik Deutschlands", Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte . 4 Ian. 1991, 38.
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to maintain stability 52 , the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov admonished
the Germans not to endanger the European balance53 , and the Italian Androetti hinted that
further EC integration should precede unification. The United States aided in the quest
for unity on behest of the Germans, but even their response was initially subdued. Why is it
that a goal which was laid out in the 1954 Rome Treaty, of which all major western
European countries are signatory, was only hesitantly adopted and with such great
reluctance? Is German unity itself seen as a great instigator for change for the worse in
Europe? Did the Italian minister Androetti speak for all when he declared that the specter
of "pan-Germanism" was an imminent threat?54
The answer to these questions as to why German reunification in and of itself should
alter Germany's role in Europe must lie in what the expectations are that unification
represents. Is unification the end result of a long, dedicated policy or is it the result of
fortuitous circumstances in the international arena?
If unification were the result of a deliberate foreign policy of the FRG in a continuum
from the days of Adenauer, then this event could be construed as a significant turning point.
For this point would mean that all the events previous to the actual event were a mere
means to an end, and that the FRG would now stand ready to reconsider and reevaluate the
obligations and commitments that were necessary to make on the long road to unification.
After all, the integration in the west was an either/or choice between the security offered by
52 Wall Street Journal . 25 Jan., 1990.
53 New York Times . 29 Jan., 1990.
^4 Gerd Langguth, "Germany, the EC, and the Architecture of Europe. The German Question in the
Context of the EC", Aussenpolitik . 11/91, 138.
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the West or the possibility of unity as a neutral state. The attainment of both security and
unity changes the calculus of German decisions. So the fears of fellow Europeans seems to
rest on the almost unlimited options that Germany now possesses.
The evidence of West German politics and writers argues against this thesis. In the
first place, unification in the manner that Adenauer envisioned had long been given up by
the time the Berlin Wall was breached, and had in fact been a moot point since the
implementation of Brandt's Ostpolitik in the early 1970's. With the goal of organizing a
"
Nebeneinandef in Europe, followed by a "Miteinandef 55 , the FRG in essence signalled
the end of its unification policy of the last two decades and surrendered to the policy of
two German states 56 . By the 1980's, unification of the sort that Adenauer envisioned, and
as actually happened, was not seriously expected by anyone. The author Giinther Grass, a
leading leftist author, condemned the division of Europe but acknowledged the futility of
unification, Theo Sommer of Die Zeit encouraged pursuit of humanitarian goals in the
GDR since unification was not a possibility in his lifetime 57 , and even Helmut Kohl
dismissed as utter nonsense proposals to put the German question on the agenda of East-
West summits as late as 1988. 58 No political group envisioned unification as a near term
^ Weifibuch 1970, Zur Sicherhcit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und zur Lage der Bundeswehr .
Presse und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, 1 1. "Nebeneinander" - next to one another, "Miteinander"
with-one-another.
56 Gert Krell, "Ostpolitik Dimensions of West German Security Policy", Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt
. 22.
57 Theo Sommer, "Germany:United but not a World Power", European Affairs. Feb./Mar. 1991, 38.
^° Jochen Thies, "German Unification- Opportunity or Setback for Europe".The World Today ,
January 1991, Vol 47, No. 1, 9.
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prospect and both major parties were dedicated to improving relations under the then
current status quo of two Germanies. 59
It is clear that though unification was still a declaratory goal of the FRG 60
,
albeit in
tenuous terms, there was no expectation that unification would occur within the foreseeable
lifetimes of anyone involved. The foreign policy of the FRG was predicated on the
principles of security and detente, but actual unification was not one of them. Instead, it
was predicated on the many relationships and ties that form the continuum from the past
and over the period of unification. It is therefore doubtful that the act of reunification, as
pleasing as it may be, will be cause for radical change and reevaluation in the basic foreign
policy of Germany. While Adenauer justified his firm commitment to the West in his
defense of the oppositions labeling of him as a Verzichtspolitiker by explaining that this
was a means to the end of unification, it seems in retrospect that his means was also his end.
Adenauer used the reunification theme (common goal ofCDU and SPD) to ellicit support
for his primary goal of finally building the strong liberal democratic institutions that he
felt were so necessary in Germany, the lack ofwhich had cursed the German nation or the
German states of the Germanic federation for centuries. 61 For the present German
government, the means are the end. 62 One significant foreign policy result that can be
59 Gert Krell,"Ostpolitik Dimensions ...",41.
60 White Paper 1985, The Situation and Development of the Federal Armed Forces . The Federal
Ministry of Defense, 9.
61 Krell, 13-14.
°2 Both Genscher (FDP) and Kohl (CDU) are strong supporters of continued integration within the EC.
Genscher's speech in Lisbon, July 12, 191, Kohls speech in Berlin at opening of the CSCE conference, June 19,
1991.
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drawn from reunification is that the FRG will no longer have to take into account how any
of its contemplated policies will affect its relations with the government of the vanished
GDR.
Relations with the East
Dennis Healey, former British Defense Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer,
warned the European Community against allowing Germany to slide away to the East.
After all, the Soviets have "just as much reason to welcome German involvement in
cultural, political, and economic life in the 21 st century as they did in the 19tn century." 63
As the leading economy in Europe and due to her geographical location, German influence
in the East is greater than any other country in Europe. Although influence cannot be
measured in financial terms alone, the vast amount of German aid to the East is an
indicator of Germany's long term objectives in that region. Without considering the
staggering sums associated with reunification, the amounts made available including
credits and export assistance total $17 billion in eastern Europe and $33.7 billion for the
Soviet Union. 64 In addition, Germany has been a leader in easing barriers to contacts in
the East such as relaxing visa requirements and allowing liberal trade policies.65 While the
other Western countries have not been standing idly by, their contributions to the East have
bJ Denis Healey, "Pax Americana is a Dangerous Illusion", European Affairs , Aug/Sep. 1991, No. 4,
42.
° Helmut Kohl, "The Agenda of German Politics for the Nineties", Speech given in Washington, DC,
May 20, 1991, printed by German Information Center, Statements and Speeches . Vol XTV, No. 5, 4-5.
65 Ibid., 4.
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not been overwhelming. Few can forget the embarrassingly paltry aid grant of $125
million that the United States offered Lech Walesa, who surely must have thought that he
had misunderstood millions for billions, in 1990 for winning the cold war66 . The EC has
been equally less forthcoming with aid, and seems to have limited its discussions to
distant accessions of Eastern European countries to the EC or EC associations such as the
1991 Europe Agreements with Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.67 If it is not
possible to establish a workable transformation process within the framework of the EC or
with the United States, the bulk of the help that the East expects and Germany demands
for its own security will have to come from Germany itself, with consequences that no one
can foresee. A forced orientation to the East could develop based on a lack of will and
ability of the western states to address the demands arising from the east.68
The concern this raises in London and Washington is the possibility for a greater
German orientation to the East. Germany has a history of mutually beneficial relations
with the East dating back to before the dawn of the modern age, and these are now
apparently being reforged under different conditions. The recent western integration is
unique in this respect, especially in the case of alliance with France. The hegemonic
aspirations of France drove the Prussian state into alliance with the Russians and British
during the Napoleonic era, and after the Treaty of Paris in 1815, Prussia was was allowed
to expand its influence into Nordrhein-Westfalen and the Rhineland-Palatinate in order to
66 1990 Congressional Almanac
. 763.
67 Langguth, 145.
68 WiLhelm Bruns, "Deutschlands Suche nach einer neuen aufienpolitischen Rolle", Deutschland Archiv .
Vol. 7, July 1991,722.
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establish Die Wacht am Rhein. (the watch on the Rhine). 69 Prussian ties with Russia were
mutually beneficial in the period that followed. After German unification under
Bismarck, the alarming rate of French militarization and the understanding that the largest
future threat to the newly created German Reich lay in the East caused Bismarck to form
the loosely knit Three Emperors League with tzarist Russia and Habsburg Austro-Hungary.
This League was strengthened in the 1881 agreements and the 1887 Reassurance Treaty. 70
After Bismarck's dismissal in 1890, these ties fell apart due to a perceived German
recklessness in international affairs, Germany was once again thrust into her historical
Mittellageas France and Russia became allies in 1894. 71 With the continuing German
alienation to the West after the First World War and the humiliating Treaty Of
Versailles, Germany concluded the Rapallo Agreement in 1922 for German Soviet
cooperation, followed by what was probably the most infamous treaty of the 20tri century,
the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact of 1939, which essentially divided up Eastern
Europe into Soviet and German spheres of influence. The pact did not last for more than
two years, but it was the last German political shift of the pre cold war era.
These examples of past binds to the East are not recounted because there is a real
possibility that any sort of Shaukelpolitik can emerge in the future. All mainstream
political parties realize and accept the permanence of the firm western integration that has
Die Wacht am Rhein - The watch on the Rhine meant that Prussia served as the first line of defense
against renewed French aggression in Europe.
70 Gordon Craig, Europe Since 1815 . The Drydon Press: New York, 1974, 184-188.
71 Craig, 306.
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emerged together with German democratic institutions.72 What is inferred is that the
recent abnormal relationship with the east, which was breached slightly by Brandt's
Ostpolitik, is at an end and that it remains to be seen what manner the ties between the East
and the EC take after 1992. The accords signed between secretary Gorbachev and
Chancellor Kohl in July of 1990 at Stavropol and the November Nonaggression treaty
between the Soviets and the Germans stir memories of 1922 and 1939 for western
intellectuals and people who had good reason to fear such a treaty in the past alike.73 If
Germany increases the ties under the guise of the EC, then this bodes well for further
deeper integration, as the current German government proposes. If, however, these ties are
almost exclusively German in nature, then this will make the problem of deeper
integration that much harder and could lead to a stall in the move to a US of Europe
(Genscher) or the confederation talked about by others (Kohl).
At the heart of the matter is the change in the role of Germany itself. During the cold
war West Germany lay at the core of the Western alliance, and East Germany at the core of
the Warsaw Pact. But both were subsumed to the larger interests of the superpowers that
they were allied to, and both were probably the strongest alliance partners in their
respective blocs. But Germany will not now be just a large player in any European ventures,
'2 Except for the Greens and extreme right Republikaner, who advocate withdrawal from NATO and
an end to the US 'occupation' of Germany. National Security Research, Inc..Challenges to NATO
Strategy: Implications for the I990's . August 1990, 165.
73 Leighton, 84.
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it will through its actions or lack thereof be the shaper of the European order and European
integration.74
The strong Atlanticist ties of the CDU are tempered by the more independently
minded German left in the SPD. The more detached views of the SPD, whether they are
in power or not, could force an air of greater independence on the German government.75
The SPD has a long tradition of opposition to the strong ties that underlie the German-
American relationship. Although Schumacher, the SPD leader in the early years of the
FRG, had credentials as an ardent anti-Nazi and prevented the SPD from being subverted
by the communists as happened to the East German SPD, he nevertheless offered the neutral
option in opposition to Adenauer that he felt would have led to German reunification at a
much earlier date and would not have placed both Germanies or a reunited Germany in the
superpower blocs. Whether this goal was unrealistic in light of the lack of German
political legitimacy after the Third Reich or not, it instilled a sense of independence in
the SPD which manifested itself over and over again over the next few decades. While the
SPD accepted the West integration of Adenauer in the Bad Godesburg party convention in
1959 as a matter of political reality and necessity, it nevertheless could take credit for
leading Germany out of the legalistic morass resulting from the Hallstein doctrine's
legalisms of the 1960's and creating the new Ostpolitik openings of the late 1960's/early
1970's. The Ostpolitik of Brandt was a demonstration of independence of tactics, within
'^Jeffrey T. Bergner, The New Superpowers. St. Martins Press: New York, 1991, 88.
75 Ibid., 68-70.
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the possibilities of the East-West detente, if nothing more.76 The period of SPD rule in
the Bundestag was marked by increased strains in relations with the United States during
the tenure of Helmut Schmidt, although the fundamental issue of western integration was
not called into question.
A sense of moral relativism also ensued during this period. American involvement in
Vietnam in the 1960's cast a shadow on the moral leadership role of the United States,
especially among the young people of Germany who became far more left leaning than
their predecessors. American catastrophes such as Mai Lai and Watergate led to a sense
that there was little mora] difference between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Both superpowers supported their own adherents based on ideology, regardless of moral or
legal rectitude. This perception was very evident in the wars of national liberation in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America. The terms "freedom Fighter" and "terrorist" were
interchangeable, depending on whose side they were fighting on.77 This comparison
equating east with west was the ideological foundation of the much vaunted third way for
Germany between capitalism and communism. The collapse of communism after 1989
has put this fear to rest, but what remains is the more independent spirit of the German left
that it fostered. Just as integration had become an end in itself without the ultimate goal
of the now achieved reunification, so has the tendency of the German left been to more








Bergner wrote that it would be surprising if the first act of the united Germany, which
is just now experiencing its new identity, would be to absorb itself and disappear into a
larger European entity.78 With the signing of the two plus four treaty, full German
sovereignty was restored and the special status of Germany with its attendant occupation
rights of the four wartime allies was concluded. Due to the speed of both German
reunification and Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe before deeper integration had
been accomplished, Germany is left with many more options in the international arena than
were previously anticipated. If another five to ten years had passed before reunification
occurred, as was believed necessary by most informed observers at the turn of the decade
mark, Germany might have already ceded certain vital elements of sovereignty to Brussels
which are right now an open question before the December EC summit in Maastricht. But
what does this actually mean? Is the gaining of full sovereignty really a watershed which
will alter the course of the present government over the next few years? Will Germany
exercise its newfound options differently now than it would have had it been West
Germany alone at the same point in time?
In a certain respect, the unification of Germany in such a short period of time has
alleviated some of the problems which the FRG alone would have faced. Much of the
political capital in the foreign policy of the FRG would have been expended in relations
with the 1990's GDR, and the FRG's relations with other countries would have been muted
by the impact that these policies would have had within the erstwhile GDR. So this is no
78 Bergner, 80.
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longer an overriding foreign relations problem, although this is not to say that the
absorption of the GDR has been an easy internal task. What this does imply is that the
removal of special status for Germany and the new sovereignty which reunification brought
are not perceived so much as a gain as an added burden.79
In this respect the united Germany has a strong continuity with the West German
government. Germany has long been accused of not towing her appropriate weight in the
world arena consummate with her economic power. Adenauer expressed it best when he
claimed that Germany was an economic giant but a political dwarf. These issues go far
back into the history of the FRG from the time the Wirtschaftswunder first took off in the
1950's, through the burdensharing tensions with the United States, and most recendy
manifested in the German response to the Gulf crisis. President Bush called on Germany
to be a "partner in leadership", but the long tradition of muted policies foreclosed this
option for the time being.
POWER POLITICS
It is ultimately in the realm of military power that the most apprehension is evident,
justified or not, when discussing Germany as a great power. The historical legacy of the
Wehrmacht and Waffen SS touches the soul of Europe, and any change in the structure or
mission of the Bundeswehr is received with wariness by Germany's neighbors.
The history of the Bundeswehr has been unmarred by any use against its neighbors,
reflecting the FRG's renouncement of force as a means to setde international disputes and
' * Heinrich August Winkler, "Nationalisms, Nationalstaat und nationale Frage in Deutschland seit
1945". Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte . 27 Sep 1991. 23.
42
underscoring the defensive nature of the Bundeswehr.80 Yet this policy has been so extreme
that it seems that short of an invasion of the German central front, the Bundeswehr would
not be used at all to protect the external interests of Germany or the international order.
The imperative now is for the Germans to find a way between the two extremes of the past,
between the Machtvergessenheit of the FRG and the Machtversehenheit of the Reichs. 81
While the exercise of responsibility and power is emphasized more in economic
performance and financial acumen in the FRG, military power cannot be removed from the
equation. The question of if, how, and when Germany exercises its military power will
determine Germany's role as a member of NATO with its possible out of area questions,
as a member of the WEU or European Army, and in a global sense, as a member of the
United Nations? Will the structure entail a nichtangriffifahigkeit, a structural inability to
conduct the offense as proposed by the peace groups or will it support some sort of
structure that has the capability to assure German/European interests around Europe or the
globe?
History of Out of Area
If issues concerning the military are politically divisive, then the out-of-area
(OOA) issue is the symbol of this division. The legacy of German world wide operations
1885- 1945 weighs heavily on the German conscience, as well as on the peace of mind of
Germany's neighbors. The German reluctance to become involved in OOA issues is as
u Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross . Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ, 1988, 123.
° ' Wilhelm Bruns, "Deutschlands Suche nach einer neuen auEenpolitischen Rolle", Deutschland Archiv ,
July 1991, 715. Machtvergessenheit- abandonment of force, Machtversehenheit- mistakes or abuses of force.
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much a result of this legacy as it is the result of its geopolitical position in the center of a
cold war Europe.
Germany was not faced with the same factors that influenced the other European
powers into becoming supporters ofOOA operations in the post war order. After the war,
the British, French, and other lesser European colonial powers had empires to maintain
against the onslaught of independence movements and foreign subversion that plagued them
for the next few decades. Germany was not faced with this problem. She had been
relieved of the problems of empire by the First World War and was not affected as such.
In addition, as Germany held the front line in the cold war, her commitment to European
defense and the American containment doctrine in Europe were absolutes.
The traditional German posture in NATO has therefore been NATO for Europe
and Europe alone. The raison d'etre of the Bundeswehr had been to supplement the allied
forces in Germany for the defense of Europe. Germany did not want to dilute its already
taxed military strength on the central front by assisting in OOA operations contrary to her
vital interests. The irony of the German position is that without the out of area issue, the
Bundeswehr may not ever have come into existence in the first place.
The ambitious force planning goals of NATO, spelled out in the Medium Term
Defense Plan of May 1950, called for ninety six divisions and a tactical Air Force of 8000
planes to counter the weight of the Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. 82 These were
extremely unrealistic goals, considering the economic plight that afflicted Europe after the
war and the American willingness to disarm itself to reap the peace dividend. France and
°2 Lawrence Kaplan, Nato and the United States: The enduring Alliance . Twayne Publishers: Boston,
1988,39-40.
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Britain in particular were unable to meet their NATO obligations. Both countries were
attempting to hold on to the empires that had nearly escaped them during the war, and
which would eventually escape them anyway. With troops stationed in Asia and Africa,
there were little resources left for Europe. In addition, visions of great power status
compelled the British to retain and the French to obtain nuclear weapons.83
The inability of Britain and France to station requisite numbers of conventional
troops in Germany made the creation of a German army a necessity. The argument that it
was only fair that Germans should bear the brunt of an attack on the central front made the
argument for creation of the Bundeswehr that much more politically palatable to the
French and British publics.
Adenauer's leverage in these years was also enhanced by the Korean war.
American involvement in Korea detracted from the ability of the US to defend Europe.
This increased the need for more European conventional forces to replace stretched
American commitments, but the British and French could not supply even their pre Korean
War commitments, much less the new demands. It thus fell on the Germans to
remilitarize, a demand which gave Adenauer much political leverage for his sovereignty
goal. In addition to creating a need for the Bundeswehr, Korea firmed up the American
anti-Soviet stance and dispelled questions concerning the necessity of allowing the
Germans to rearm.
Adenauer's perspective on the out-of-area issue was not only influenced by his
desire to avoid colonial conflicts and actions sanctioned by the United Nations, an
83 Hanrieder, 40.
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organization to which Germany was denied membership. He also worried about the
implications of "guilt by association" in third world adventures. But even more
important, OOA undertakings by not just Germany, but any other ally, could detract
troops and material from the central front in a period when war with the Soviet bloc was a
very real possibility. 84 Thus, Adenauer was alarmed by the French removal of troops from
Germany during the Algerian war, and likewise the French-British action in the 1956 Suez
crisis and the American Lebanon intervention in 1958. 85 In the 1950s, his aversion to
allowing Germany to be drawn into the colonial affairs of its European allies was echoed
by the United States, which had the same fears but was not as successful in avoiding this
predicament as is evidenced by the burden of Vietnam.
The most significant rift with United States over the OOA issue arose during the
Yom Kippur war in 1973. The basing and overflight rights of the US military were
severely curtailed when the West German government forbade the use of German ports or
airfields as the source of origin for American equipment bound for Israel. Although this
ban was supported by die majority of the West German people, it was rationalized to the
Americans in hindsight as unnecessary, since the Israeli army had already repulsed the
attack before the American action would have been taken, a fact that was not obvious until
after the fact.86
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This point marked the extreme in German resistance to the out-of-area issue.
West German realization that their national interest lay in the middle east as well as the
American led the Schmidt government to accede to the 1982 Wartime Host Nation
Support Agreement (WHNS) with the United States, which spelled out German logistical
support and reserve duties in augmenting rear area security duties in support of US forces
stationed in Germany who might have to be moved to the Gulf. This complemented the
airspace access agreements and other defense issues that had been negotiated with the FRG
the previous year. 87 Units of the German navy deployed to the Mediterranean in the 1987
Gulf crisis in order to relieve units of other alliance members who could then in turn
deploy to the Gulf. 88 However, until the situation in Europe thawed in 1989, the FRG was
opposed to the use ofNATO in the out-of-area role for any reason and continued to stress
the conflict prevention vice intervention role for the FRG.
The German government is now faced with the dilemma of new OOA demands
without the comfortable constructs of the East-West conflict to fall back upon. There is no
central front to be diluted by OOA operations anymore, nor are there any colonial
conflicts to be dragged into. Germany has as much of her national interest at stake abroad
as the French and British do.
Chancellor Kohl now realizes that Germany must come to grips with its
responsibilities abroad and the OOA issue. While using the NATO area as the defining
term for the OOA issue, he nonetheless suggests that German OOA commitments could
87 Stuart and Tow, 268-269.
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be made in the context of the WEU or UN. 89 The reason for omitting the NATO
context from this remark is most likely connected to the German and general European
desire to remain out of the military adventureism of the United States. As Marion Grafin
Donhoff remarked in Die Zeit
The Europeans do not wish to be forced into collaboration in such activities as the
bombing of Libya or Panama. They regard with a certain skepticism Washington's
tendency to act as world policeman and in doing so to measure the world by two
standards. 90
While the United States is one of the biggest supporters of a German OOA
policy, this could become a problem for future US- German relations, as the Germans will
undoubtedly limit their role to those areas it feels are in its vital national interests or
European interests, not the US' interests. 91
Current Out of Area Concerns
While a majority of Germans support an increased global role for Germany
including such measures as economic sanctions, humanitarian aid, financing ofUN
sponsored interventions, or UN peacekeeping roles, the majority still do not support an
actual German participation in an interventionist role. 92 Reaction against the German
°* Helmut Kohl, Speech at Washington, D.C. on May 20, 1991, Statements and Speeches, Vol. XIV,
No. 5, 6.
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tradition of force and statecraft reminiscent 1863-1945 is often cited as the reason for
German ambivalence toward the use of force today, but there is more to it than that.
Germany was an 'importer' of security for the entire period of the cold war and never
developed the strong tradition of 'exporting' security to its allies or smaller nations
resisting aggressors as have its principal allies. 93 The very concept of the central front
fought by all NATO allies in Germany illustrates this point. As a result, Germans are
very divided not only on potential roles of the military, but on the extreme left, on the
very necessity of the military to begin with.
Starting with the this last group, the argument is raised that military force is an
anachronism in today's world, that the weapons are so destructive and inhumane that their
use should not even be prepared for. This idealistic and extreme position influences even
the mainstream German left, such as the following statement by the SPD's representative
Ludwig Stiegler:
Peace alone will emanate from German soil in the future, after having for so long
exported only war. The new federal government should concentrate on peace and
development initiatives and global conflict solving strategies without the use of
force, and this will become the symbol of the German contribution to the family of
nations. 94
He further states that the contribution of Germany to the development of the
United Nations is the development of the forces of peace, and that force of arms cannot be
used even under the direction of the world body. Part of this reluctance is based on the
93 Ibid, 19.
94 Ludwig Stiegler, "SPD: Konflictregelungsfahigkeit, nicht Gewaltfahigkeit der UNO steigern",
Frieden und Abrustung . Sondernummer 1/91, 7.
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continuum of the moral relativism of the German left of the 1970's/1980's, wherein the
United Nations was perceived as an organization whose true peaceful purposes were
subverted by the superpowers, who used the guise of the world body to relegate themselves
a free hand to intervene wherever they chose, be it in the Gulf or in the Baltics.95 This
moral relativism made peace an absolute value without first prefacing it with the equally
important values of liberty, justice, and freedom. The solution to any problem would thus
have to entail peace at any cost.96 Absolute values such as these as a matter of state policy
are just as dangerous and hegelian as the those embraced in Germany prior to 1945.
However, the mainstream political parties are agreed that a military force of
some kind is warranted. The arguments arise when the issues of how and where to employ
them arises. Are German soldiers restricted to only defending the FRG if direcdy
attacked, could they be restricted to only blue helmet peacekeeping roles of the UN or
could they be used in multinational intervention operations? The questions do not proceed
beyond this point, since military intervention which is solely German is ruled out by all
parties to this question.
The use of force issue does not necessarily delineate across liberal-conservative
lines. Christian Democrats as well as Social Democrats split among themselves on the
degree of latitude that should be allowed. Even Frieden und Abrustung, a German
periodical for peace initiatives, discusses the need for force in the final analysis. In much
of the world, war is still the continuation of politics by other means, a statement made by
95 Ibid, 7.
*° Oberst i.G.Hans-Georg Atzinger, Emerg in g German Security Policy: The Dispute on Out of Area
Employments . US Army War College Military Studies Paper, 10 March 1992, 10.
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the Prussian Clausewitz, and holds especially true in the third world where the subject of
intervention arises. This means that the legitimate state needs credible support from the
world community. Peace cannot be brought about by the absence of force.
German Minister of Defense Stoltenburg argues that ethically responsible politics
cannot be pursued without having military force, but he stops short of promoting
intervention in the out of area realm even in the national interest.97 He tempers this with
the understanding that regardless ofhow a nation or group of nations behave, the use of
force, or more succinctly stated, the misuse of force will not disappear from the realm of
international relation.98
Legal Obligations and Legal Ambiguity
The ambiguity surrounding the constitutional basis for employment of the
German military outside of Germany served the low tone style of the West German
government well for decades. It was politically expedient to use the excuse that Germany
was constitutionally incapable of making OOA commitments in light of the allied
approved Basic Law instead of the bolder act of refusal based on political grounds instead
of constitutional grounds. This worked well for many years since few were willing to
press the issue in light of both East and West Germany's special circumstances. 99
y
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The continuity of this policy did not survive German unification, however. Allies
and many German conservatives appalled at the lack of German enthusiasm and support for
the GulfWar looked closer at the BL and reached the conclusion that there really was no
such constitutional constraint at all. This conclusion was reached by many constitutional
and international law experts as well. 100
The BL is ambiguous enough in this respect that the Social Democrats and others
on the left of the political spectrum disagree with the foregoing conclusion
wholeheartedly. They maintain that any deployment in an interventionist role is
definitely unconstitutional, and that the only real issue to be decided is if German forces
could be used in UN peacekeeping missions. 101
This ambiguity has led to calls to amend the constitution from all political
corners. The Christian Democrats by and large believe that although Germany is presently
constitutionally capable of OOA operations, a constitutional amendment should be
drafted to clarify this. But they hesitate in that the Social Democrats also wish to amend
the constitution, but with the goal of making the BL more restrictive. At present, the
coalition government of Helmut Kohl does not have the two thirds majority necessary for
such an amendment.
The issues boil down to whether the military can be used only in a limited role as
peacekeeping forces under UN command or whether they could be used in a broader
100 Ibid.
1U1
"Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen: Der Bescluft des SPD-Parteitags zu Blauhelmen im
Wortlauf", Suddeutsche Zdtung . 1 June 1991, 10.
52
combat capacity as part of a multinational UN mandated intervention role. None of the
parties advocate use of the Bundeswehr on a purely national case basis.
The German Basic Law
The constitutional arguments revolve around the primacy of -Article 24 or Article
87a of the Basic Law (BL). Opponents of intervention cite the later article in their
arguments:
Article 87a I— 1 1 1 of the basic law reads:
I. The federation provides military forces for defense. The numerical strength
and general organization of the Armed Forces raised for defense by the Federation
shall be shown in the budget.
II. Except for defense, these forces may only be committed as the basic law
explicitly allows.
III. In cases of defense (Verteidigungsfall) and heightened tensions, the military
forces must protect ... 102
It is clear from Article 87a-II that since the BL does not explicitly sanction the
use of forces outside of Germany and defense is not defined but is taken to be the defense
of ones country under attack, that the BL in effect does not sanction the use of military
forces, which are only raised for defense per subsection I. This argument continues with the
equating of the two terms Verteidigung and Verteidigungsfall as defined above.
Verteidigungsfall is constitutionally defined in Article 115 a. 1 as the
determination by the Bundestag, in conjunction with the Bundesrat, that the territory of the
federation has been attacked with military forces. The two terms go hand in hand and
102
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should not be confused by exercises in semantic manipulations, as is done by proponents of
OOA in refuting this argument. 103
In the case of an extensive interpretation of the basic law, it is clear that the
drafters of Article 87 consciously used Verteidigung and Verteidigungsfall to differentiate
between the cases of defense as is used, amongst others, in international law, and the case
where the territory of the FRG is under attack or imminent attack. In this case,
Verteidigungsfall on\y applies to events internal to the FRG under attack and cannot be used
in arguments concerning the use of military power in areas outside of Germany. Since
these two terms are not equatable, the issue of using the Bundeswehr outside ofGermany has
to only fulfill the requirement that it be in a case of defense. In such a case, the defense of
Kuwait in the Persian Gulf War would be allowed, and lacking a constitutional definition
of 'defense', the meaning would derive from international law, which is discussed in the
next section.
For the proponents of intervention, even though the arguments about Article 87 can
be refuted, the real issue is that Article 24 of the BL takes precedence. Article 24. 2 states:
For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may enter into a system of mutual
collective security: in doing so it shall consent to such limitations upon its rights of
sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and
among the nations of the world.
This article clearly gives precedence to the requirements of international law and
was written with the understanding that West Germany would soon be joining various
international organizations which would bind her to her neighbors and the concept of
UJ Mathias Bartke, "Die Trennung zwischen Biindnisfall und Verteidigungsauftrag", Frieden und
Ahrtisrung , 24.
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western integration. It follows that Germany is bound to honor the commitments made
when she joined NATO and when she joined the United Nations. In addition, the BL does
not constrain the Bundeswehr to any geographic area, and that this article has to be
evaluated considering the context of the time of its adoption less than a decade after the
end of the war. 104 The opposition offers the refutation that this article does not specifically
authorize OOA operations as required by Article 87, in their argument the primary
article, and so does little to further the cause of constitutionally allowing an OOA
mission. 105
United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter, to which Germany became subject in her 1973
accession, is more explicit in what is required of member states. The obligations and
responsibilities of member countries are more clear. Article 1 (1) lists the purposes of the
United Nations:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace... 106
The key phrase here is that collective action can be taken to suppress aggression.
The famous Article 2(4) of the charter, which prohibits the use of force to settle
104 vanOrden,354.
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international disputes, states that this applies when it is not contrary to the purposes of the
UN Article 1. When taken in conjunction with the self defense clause of Article 51, it is
apparent that states do have the responsibility to hold and restore order under international
law. Forces for such an action comes from Article 43, which requires member nations to
contribute forces to maintain international peace and security. Constitutional lawyers
agree that the UN charter authorizes the use of force in collective security, but is not clear
as to how to use them, whether under UN command or national commands as in the Gulf
War.
These issues continue to be debated today. It is clear that following the SPD
party conference in Bremen in May of 1991 that at the very least, the Bundestag has the
necessary support for a German peacekeeping "blue helmet" role in the United Nations.
But even the SPD's Willy Brandt, while maintaining that he was not aware of any
limitations imposed on Germany by its entry into the UN in his chancellorship, declared
that a "Blue helmet" role would not be sufficient to support the UN's role in cases of
severe human rights abuses in member states. 107
The lack of consensus on these issues reflects a healthy public debate which is one
of the virtues and one of the pitfalls of a democracy. But until a satisfactory consensus can
be reached, German reliability as a responsible member of the world community will
continue to be called into question. German revulsion to its pre 1945 legacy and its
tradition of as a security 'importer' since then have created barriers which will take time to
change. The CDU/CSU FDP coalition has announced its intentions to work toward this
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end, but this is a goal which will take public education and awareness to fulfill.
Constitutional resolution is not expected until at least 1994. 108
'
°° Marc Fisher, "One Germany, Still Divided Over its Military Role", International Herald
Tribune. 29 February 1992, 5.
57
*°
Chapter IV: Case study Yugoslavia
The sources of change in Germany and their historical roots which have caused and
will continue to cause revision of the European and world order were examined in the last
chapter. The territorial revision of the unification process is the most obvious revision of
recent times, but continued revision in terms of traditional spheres of influence and
political leadership will continue. Michael Lind writes in the New York Times that "the
new Germany, like its predecessors, has proved that it is a revisionist power, intent on
reshaping Europe", continuing later on with the rhetorical question: "Can global
revisionism be far behind?" 109 With this statement and question, Lind gets to the heart of
the issue surrounding Germany's role in the world. It is not so much a question of if
global revisionism will be practiced, but what kind of revisionism Germany will pursue
in die years ahead. To assume that the world could live through the period 1989-1991
without major revision to global economic-political roles is absurd, yet this assumption is
precisely the stand taken by many who fear the role of unified Germany in the future. no
Many of the sources of Germany's previous revisionist policies still exist in Europe
and the world. Geographically, it is still situated in the Mittellage between a very
prosperous West and an impoverished East, and integral nationalism has once again flared
up in various areas in eastern and southern Europe. But unlike previous German states, the
I™ Michael Lind, "Recognize the Power of the New Germany", New York Times . 27 Dec. 1991, 19.
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current Germany is not threatened militarily by any major powers which would require an
armed response. In addition, Germany is a leading member in European international
institutions such as the EC and the CSCE, which constrain unilateral German action to a
certain extent. In this respect at least, the continuity of revisionism in a unified Germany
that Lind writes of is not as pronounced nor of an antagonistic nature as in the period 1863-
1945.
So what are these revisionist goals of Germany? The major declared goal of
Germany currently has to be the transformation of Europe into a more cohesive political
and economic body, one that is a single economic market and has a mechanism for a
consensus in foreign policy. This task is cited repeatedly by German leaders as their
major goal and was particularly pressed hard for by the Germans at the EC summit
meeting at Maastricht in November of 1991. Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister
Genscher in particular envision a Europe with some sort of political union and certainly a
strong economic union. They see these conditions as the necessary precondition for Europe
to assume her role as a world power. Without unity, the individual European states will
never transcend the petty infighting that has thwarted greater Europeanists since Napoleon.
Kohl believes that only a strong and closed European Community can have strong influence
on the European continent and work side by side with the US to assume global
responsibilities. 111 Yet the prospect of having a united European policy gives litde
reassurance to those who believe that this goal is a euphemism for traditional German
Weltmachtpolitik being pursued under the aegis of a common European policy. 112 By
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its sheer size and population on the continent, Germany already has considerable influence
in the European council and is in fact expected to take the lead in many areas.
Much of the consternation about Germany comes from the very fact that revision,
particularly territorial in October of 1990, has happened and will continue to occur as a
natural consequence of the end of the cold war. The manner in which the world community
in general and the major European powers in particular contend with this new and more
powerful Germany will be almost as important to the method of German statecraft as the
will of German statesmen themselves. A reaction that ignores German political
development over the last forty-five years and mis-assigns the nationalistic and war-prone
political culture to the Germans as existed during the period 1871-1945 could well force a
confrontational style to develop in place of the cooperative style that is evident in German
foreign policy today. Such misgivings are evident in the uneasy writings of Europeans and
Americans who experienced German aggression in the past. A glaring example of such
foreboding is Spanish publicist Helano Sana, who writes in his book The Fourth Reich that
"under its democratic Anglo-saxon shell the Federal Republic is a deeply hegelian state
which is bent on suppressing divergence and nonconformity, and will tolerate as litde
pluralism as possible." 113 Not to be outdone by the Spanish, historian William Shirer,
whose epochal work The Rise and Fall ofthe Third Reich first appeared in print
thirty-one years ago, writes from the other side of the Atlantic that the historical outlook
is not very bright for those who have twice in this century been invaded by the Teutonic
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hordes. He resurrects a dated cold war mentality when he praises the virtue of the H-bomb
in suggesting a future solution to any German problem that might arise. 114
By the same token, a reaction that assumes a continued German foreign policy based
on the last forty-five years could be equally dangerous. Assumptions regarding the
continued workings of statecraft, positions within alliances, and thought patterns in general
that were derived in the cold war era are pernicious. 115 Such assumptions were valid and
effective at the time but are no longer relevant. During the cold war, Germany and in fact
most of the NATO allies were inclined to follow the US policy lead, forming a
somewhat comfortable impression on all involved regarding the workings and effectiveness
of international bodies because all parties had a vital national interest at stake. To assume
a continued junior partner role for Germany is not only unsound, but in fact unreasonable
when it runs counter to the German national interest. The redefinition of roles and the
prioritization of national strategies are the revisions that must occur but which make US
state department officials worried at the same time.
In short, German history, be it the period 1870-1945 or the period 1945-1989, cannot
be ignored or assumed. The assertiveness that emerged in German statecraft reminiscent
of the first half of this century cannot be taken out of context of the German political
culture that has developed over the latter time period. Nor can the German passivity of
the 1945-1989 period be extrapolated into the future. It is a synthesis of the two, the
greater Weltanschauung of the former period with the liberal western political culture of
the latter, which makes present German statecraft unique, the first inklings of which
1 14 William L_ Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, with new afterword, Simon & Shuster,
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emerged in the GulfWar and which became more pronounced in the crisis in the Balkans.
An independence of action was demonstrated in both cases, be it the independence of
action through inaction in the Gulf War, as perceived by Germany's allies, or an
independence of action through action, as demonstrated in the Balkan crisis. In both cases
Germany took an independent path from its allies.
The German action in the Balkans from June through December of 1991 makes a good
case study for several reasons. Germany took an independent stance and forged her own
policies in the face of heavy resistance by her alliance partners, and having taken this stance,
would not alter it. It is also more revealing because it was action that appeared to be more
deliberately planned than the bumbling inaction during the GulfWar. The war in January
of 1991 caught the Germans unprepared in the wake of unification and inwardly focused in
a nation-building exercise which cannot be compared to domestic difficulties that could
have likewise diverted the attention of other countries. The Balkan policy after June 1991,
on the other hand, developed over a much greater time period and was a German initiative
from the start.
Background
The Balkan crisis which brought German diplomacy to the forefront in the last months
of 1991 is no new development for Europe. This area has been a source of conflict for the
rest of Europe for at least half a millennium. The most famous and drastic conflict which
stemmed from the Balkans was of course the assassination of the archduke Ferdinand in
Sarajevo in 1914 by Serbian extremists, an event that triggered the First World War. But
this is by any means the only case. The Balkan geo strategic position along the land lines
of communication from central Europe to the Ottoman Empire and the Muslim world
made it a battle ground for the conflicts between an earlier East and West. The ethnicity
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and rampant nationalistic conflicts now underway are just the surface manifestations of the
deeper cultural and religious backgrounds of the myriad of ethnic groups. The northern
provinces of Croatia and Slovenia are more closely tied to the latin-catholic-hapsburg
tradition of Austro-Hungary and Germany than the Cyrillic-orthodox-ottoman tradition
of the Serbs. 116 In addition to these historical schisms, the recent economic policies of
the Slovenians and Serbs differ considerably and continue to diverge. The market
oriented style being pursued in Zagreb is at odds with the centralized command economic
system of Belgrade, 117 which has led to problems as Slovenian manufactured goods take
an ever increasing percentage of Yugoslavia's internal market.
These historical conditions lay dormant during the cold war, as did nationality and
economic issues of the rest of Eastern and Southern Europe. Although Yugoslavia as such
was not part of the Soviet sphere of influence as were the rest of the communist countries of
Eastern Europe, it suffered the same results of forty-five years of economic mal-
administration. The tide of change that transformed Eastern Europe also affected the
dormant yearnings for autonomy or outright independence in major Yugoslav ethnic
groups: Slovenian, Croatian, Albanian, and to a lesser extent, Italian and Albanian in
Kosovo and Muslims in Herzegovina.
These issues first arose in the years after the death of B. Tito, the Croatian partisan
who formed the present Yugoslavian state in the aftermath of the Second World War.
Continued disagreements reached crisis proportion when the Slovenian and Croatian
1J " Theo Sommer, "Was geht uns schon Jugoslawien an?", Die Zeit , 24 May 1991, 1. See also A.J.P.
Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe
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governments announced the primacy of state law over federal law on Oct. 4, 1990 and
unveiled their "Model for Confederation in Yugoslavia". This model called for a
confederation of democratic parliamentary systems with free market systems, conditions
that Serbia would have been unable to meet due to, amongst other things, the manner in
which it administered its two provinces of Montenegro and Macedonia. 118 In addition,
they amended their constitutions to transfer territorial defense forces and responsibilities
to local state control, a move strongly opposed by the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), a
Serbian controlled and somewhat independent Yugoslav state instrument. 119
These declarations were the precursors to more extreme demands for autonomy and
independence, culminated in the combined Croatian and Slovenian declaration of
sovereignty on June 25, 1991. These moves were immediately repudiated by the Belgrade
government, which sought to stem the breakup of the federal system through force of arms.
The humiliating attempt in Slovenia in the summer nonetheless underscored the
willingness of the Milosevic regime in Belgrade to use force as necessary to achieve its
aims. The subsequent use of force in Croatia, which is not as geographically remote nor as
ethnically homogeneous as Slovenia, was to be expected in light of the previous attempt to
quell the Slovenian movement, yet it appeared by the reaction of the major European and
world powers as if they had been caught by surprise.
This maxim held true for Germany as well throughout the spring and summer of
1991. It seemed that German statesmen, still dazed from the rapid play of events in the
Gulf War that left allies disappointed and the public confused, were willing to adopt a
1 J ° Jens Reuter, "Jugoslavien in Umbruch", Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte . 2 Nov. 1990, Vol. 45, 15.
*'" Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslavia: Things Fall Apart?", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty , Vol
VIII, No.5, 1 Nov. 1990, 1.
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wait-and-see attitude toward Yugoslavia as well, even though their sympathies were with
the Slovenians and Croatians from the start. But an unusually optimistic and unrealistic
expectation that everything would turn out alright in the end seemed to prevail in this crisis
as it had previously during the Gulf crisis. 120
Policy Options
The dilemma of German policy in response to the Yugoslav crisis had many inter-
related and yet conflicting facets. They shared the sentiments of the French, British an
Americans in eschewing direct intervention in the crisis because it was after all an internal
crisis of sons. Then too the established western powers had been struggling with the
recognition of new states issue with the Soviet Union as well, in particular the three Baltic
republics which had declared independence months before and still had not been
recognized. If agreement in the Baltic cases could not be reached when these three states
had never had their legitimacy questioned since they had been forcibly annexed into the
Soviet Union in 1941, then how much harder would it be to recognize ethnically
heterogeneous republics in Yugoslavia? Even though the Yugoslavian question was more
diffuse than the case of the Baltic republics, it would nonetheless have set a precedent for
the Soviet republics which the Soviet central government was adamantly opposed to. In
this they were supported by the United States, which set the maintenance of the central
Soviet government as its primary goal. But there were other factors at work as well.
120 Jochen Thies, "Germany: Tests of Credibility", The World Today . Vol. 37, No 6, June 1991
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While some argued that Germany should have taken the lead initially due to its
objective status in regards to nationality questions 121 , it is clear from the German press
that sentiments in general have been overwhelmingly in favor of Croatia, Slovenia, and self
determination. Even though Germany officially was holding off on recognition during the
fall, Germany began treating the two republics as semi-sovereign states, even accepting
Croatian and Slovenian issued passports at the German border. 122 Further, the German
intervention in the Balkans in 1941, preceded by the defeat of Serbia by the Entente powers
in 1916, still lays deep in the memory of many Serbians who fought a four year partisan
war against the Germans and their brutal puppet state, the Independent Croatian State, a
fact often repeated in recent Serbian newscasts. 123 And while there are insignificant
numbers of Germans living in Yugoslavia, the number of Croats and other Yugoslavian
nationals living in Germany is considerable at around 700,000 workers 124 , of which about
two-thirds are Croatian. German interest in the area is thus hardly objective, yet other
issues influenced the German government to wait out the outcome as well.
In the realm of international law, the Germans were faced with the dilemma of a
fellow CSCE member nation taking up arms against its citizenry in violation of the
Helsinki final act and the CSCE Charter of Paris of Nov. 1990. At the same time, the
United Nations charter and the CSCE forbade armed intervention in another country, and
in any case the CSCE Charter of Paris did not address the right of secession of states. The
121 Thomas Kielinger, "Yugoslavia: EC Must Send a Clear Message", The German Tribune. 21 July,
1991. from Rheinisher Merkur/ Christ und Welt . Bonn. 12 July 1991. 3.
122
"Visafreiheit fur Kroaten und Slowenen?"Frankfurter Allgemeine.17 October 1991, D42.
12^ Ranko Petkovic, "Yugoslavia versus Yugoslavia", European Affairs . Vol.1, Feb/Mar. 1991, 74.
124 Hans-Dietrich Genscher, "Erklarung des Bundesministers", Bulletin No. 144, 19 Dec 1991, 1175.
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dilemma boiled down to the definition of self-determination; whether the sovereignty of
the state to act without outside threats has precedence or whether the individual right to
human rights and a democratic form of government came first. 125
The resolution of the Yugoslavian question in favor of recognition of the separatist
states would have impaired relations with the then still existent Soviet Union, which was
batding its own separatist movements. The Soviets were very much set against the breakup
of Yugoslavia, and in fact were the first major country to respond to the June 25
independence announcement by Slovenia, indicating their strong disapproval of this step
and admonishing neighboring countries to the inadmissibility of intervention or
internationalization of the crisis. 126
While the Germans respected the Soviet fears of the precedent that would be set if the
legitimacy of independent Yugoslavian states were transferred to the breakaway republics
of the Soviet Union, they nonetheless did not back the unified state policy of the Soviets.
They felt that the influence of the EC and the CSCE conflict prevention mechanisms
could be used for a peaceful resolution of the problem. But the outbreak of further violence
in Yugoslavia made the latter option less tenable, while the abortive coup attempt in the
Soviet Union which led to the final breakup of the Soviet state cleared the implied
constraint on German policy imposed by the Soviets.
The conservative line adopted de facto by the EC in August, along with the United
States and the United Nations, was to negotiate an all encompassing political settlement
to the crisis, the first step being a cessation of hostilities agreed to by both sides. The UN
^5 Robert Leicht, "Europas jugoslawische Zwickmuhle", Die Zeit. No. 38, 20 September 1991, 1.
126 Suzanne Crow, "Moscow Opposes Foreign Interference in Yugoslav Crisis, Backs Unified State",
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute . Vol. VIII, No. 40, 10 Aug 1991, 8.
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could then send in a peacekeeping force and the issues separating the antagonists could be
resolved diplomatically. Recognition of the dissident republics should not be made prior
to this event, however. Lord Carrington of the EC and UN envoy Cyrus Vance
admonished repeatedly against early recognition as this could lead to further secessions by
other states, thus inflaming the Serbians further and broadening the war. 127
The German argument to the contrary was that the fighting was already severe and
cease-fires were being broken by both sides as fast as they could be arranged. Helmut Kohl
was already waring the Bundestag that continued fighting would force the government into
recognizing those republics which no longer wished to be part of Yugoslavia. 128 The
solution to the problem lay in first recognizing the de facto governments in Croatia and
Slovenia, thus turning the civil war into a war between two sovereign states if it were to
continue. This would then isolate Serbia, which has been the acknowledged main culprit in
both the fighting and in the breaking of cease-fires. By withholding recognition, this
reasoning went, the EC was in fact sanctioning the me of force to attain a satisfactory status
quo for the Serbians.
The German Initiative
With the Soviet Union splintering into many different republics and the war
continuing on regardless of the measures taken by the EC countries, including repeated
cease-fires and a threatened economic embargo of Yugoslavia, Germany began pushing for
127 Leslie Gelb, "Tomorrow's Germany", New York Times . 22 December 1991, Ell.
1 28 Helmut Kohl, "Statement on the Situation and the Develoments in the Soviet Union and
Yugoslavia", advance trans, of text provided by German Embassy. 4 September 1991.
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the second option: recognition of the dissident states without the precondition of a cease-
fire and deployment of United Nations troops.
The British, French, and American governments were opposed to this idea and the
first two had a draft resolution prepared for security council deliberation. Its intention
was to issue warnings to countries who would unilaterally recognize the dissident states
before a unified position of all the major countries could be worked out. But on Dec 13,
chancellors Kohls office announced that Germany would proceed with recognition of these
states after a meeting of foreign ministers on the 16th of December, regardless of the
outcome. 129 The meeting of the foreign ministers would be used to son out the details of
what conditions would have to be met for recognition, not to resolve the question of if
recognition should be offered.
In a explanation delivered at Dresden on the 17tn of December, Chancellor Kohl
clarified the results of the foreign ministers meeting of the previous day in Brussels. The
communique requested of those Yugoslavian republics that wished to, to declare by the 23
of December if:
• they desired recognition as independent states,
• they would respect the UN charter and the responsibilities entailed therein,
• they would follow the Helsinki final acts and the Charter of Paris, with emphasis on
the democratic government and human rights,
• they would guarantee the rights of ethnic and national minorities as embodied in the
CSCE,
12
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• they would respect of national borders, which can only be changed peacefully and
consentually. 130
Those republics which declared their intentions to meet these requirements would
then be recognized as the 15tn ofJanuary, 1992. The federal chancellor stressed that though
this was a great foreign policy success for the Federal Republic, it should be noted that
from the start the Germans did not want to go it alone along this path. 131
Reactions
The reaction to this foreign policy success of Germany was mixed. In Germany, it
was announced that a successful compromise arrangement had been reached between the 12
members of the EC 132 , which was received well by the public which had exerted growing
pressure on the government for some sort of action in the crisis. But in Washington, this
same success was seen as a dangerous precedent of the new Germany going not only its own
way, but on a path opposed to by the US. The road they had taken was 'fraught with
danger', as president Bush explained, and the United States would still oppose selective
recognition in lieu of comprehensive political settlements. 133 State department officials
expressed alarm at the German show of resolve. The 'partnership in leadership' that
president Bush had offered in May 1989 had not been intended to sanction divergent
13 Helmut Kohl, "Beschliisse der EG-Aufienminister zur Anerkennung neuer Staaten", Bulletin .
No.144, 19 December 1991, 1173-1174.
131 Ibid.
*->*
"Euopaische Gemeinschaft: Kompromifi zu Jugoslawien", Deutschland Nachtrichten . 20 December
1991,1.
133 pau i LeWj S) "U.N. Yields to Plans by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics", New York
Times
. 16 December 1991, 1.
70
policies from the US, but instead had been aimed at promoting common interests. When
these common interests were not wholeheartedly supported by Germany, the two
outstanding examples being the GulfWar and the GAIT talks, then Washington became
riled at the German propensity to hide in the crowd of Europe and adopt middle of the
road and 'under responsible' positions. 134 Much of the consternation in Washington
seemed to be based on the timing of the German decision. The first independent policy
initiative of the new Germany did not have to fly in the face of Germany's principal
allies.
The concern in the US is that this "success" is the beginning of a new policy of a
German unilateral approach to foreign policy. The new German assertiveness made state
department officials uneasy and was hard to stomach in the context of the Federal
Republic of old. 135 But there are several points to keep in mind when using this sort of
maintain-the-staus-quo logic.
As Chancellor Kohl pointed out in his Dresden release, Germany led the way in this
undertaking. She did not go it alone. Italy, Austria, Denmark, and Belgium were with
Germany at the time of the confrontation with France and Great Britain 136 , and the final
decision to recognize the new republics was hardly unilateral; it was agreed to unanimously
by the 12 member European council. 137 This statement does not imply that Germany did
not, as the Times put it, 'flex its muscle'. But as Leslie Gelb illustrated, Germany had to
134 Giinther Gillessen, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung . 20 December 1990, D41.
*35 David Binder, "US is Worried by Bonn's New Assertiveness", The New York Times . 7 January
1992,1.
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take the lead to get European unity on this subject. France was not influential enough for
the task and Britain did not want the job. 138
Then too there is the suspicion that even if Germany is not acting unilaterally in its
foreign affairs, it is certainly wearing the mantle of the European community to mask
German policies as European policies. 139 Foreign Minister Genscher almost always speaks
in the context of a European policy, but when a European policy entails a German "success,
as did the adoption of the German Yugoslav agenda and was so described by a Genscher
aide 140
, it is difficult to reconcile the two.
The reaction in Washington had a hint of hysteria to it, which rapidly made its way
into the press. When chancellor Kohl said that this was a great Erfolg (success) on December
17tn , the New York Times translated this statement as a great "victory" instead of a great
"success" as would have been proper. In a prominent New York Times article 141 this was
then retranslated back into the German as a Sieg (victory) by persons unknown and then this
word was used as the basis for comparison to the various types of "Siege" of the Third
Reich and how Kohl had proclaimed the first Sieg since 1945. Cooler heads prevailed and
the a retraction was later printed. 142
3.
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military Options
The use of military force outside of the NATO area was discussed at length in the
last chapter in general terms. But in this specific case, the members of the EC and
particularly Germany, ruled out military intervention at an early stage, especially since the
then still existent Soviet Union had warned against military intervention in Yugoslavia by
any outside forces. 143
The German policy toward Yugoslavia supported this decision. The German
government had incurred the wrath of its alliance partners and certain conservative
domestic political circles in the GulfWar by not supporting the military effort with
Bundeswehr troops. This was based on the historical interpretation problems with the
constitution as discussed earlier in this thesis; problems that had not been resolved at the
time and have in fact not been resolved up to the present time. The arguments against an
OOA military employment for the time being had been so effectively developed both
domestically and internationally that even if they had wanted to intervene militarily, they
would have done so at great cost to their credibility and reliability not only within the
alliance, but in eastern and southeastern Europe as well. Nonetheless, the specter of nightly
television broadcasts from Croatia showing the bloody fighting had a telling effect on
opinions concerning intervention, and a minority view was that military intervention might
be required. 144 Two ministers of the cabinet backed a multinational military intervention
in the Balkans in order to stop the bloodshed.
14^ Suzanne Crow, "Moscow Opposes Foreign Interference in Yugoslav Crisis, Backs Unified State",
Radio Free Europe,/Radio Liberty Research Institute . Vol VIII, No. 40, 10 August 1991, 8.
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controversial survey conducted in October/November 1991 , only 23 % of respondents favored a Gulf War
type military intervention.
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Minister of the Interior Schauble, a protege of Kohl 145
,
and Labor Minister Bliim
both abandoned the CDU party line and supported Bundeswehr intervention under UN
command. They cited the urgency of the situation and the priority of stopping the
murders in Croatia as the justification for the use of force to stop the fighting. 146
Although the government had not ruled out a United Nations peacekeeping role for the
Bundeswehr at some future time when all warring factions could agree to such a force,
Schaubel's position clearly annoyed the foreign office for evoking expectations that could
not be realized. 147
Significance of Germany's Yugoslavian Policy
The German policy in Yugoslavia emphasized the changed geo-political structure in
Europe. For the first time since its founding, the Federal Republic initiated a bold
foreign policy program and carried it out despite resistance from Britain, France, the
United States, and the United Nations. By this action, Germany took the lead in
formulating a policy for not only the Balkans, but the republics in the former Soviet Union
as well. But it also cast doubts into its alliance partners in the direct and decisive way in
which Germany compelled others to follow the its lead.
One of the enduring German traits which caused President Bush to call on the Germans
to be partners in leadership was their stability and predictability. In their latest foreign
policy move, Germany seemingly discarded many of its previous foreign policy maxims:
14
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shunning interventions in the internal affairs of other countries, respecting borders,
preserving the status quo, or promoting stability. 148
The unilateral decision to proceed with recognition alarms many observers who see
this as revived German particularism. But this fear is hard to comprehend in light of the
circumstances. Britain and France had tried and failed to bring the fighting to a halt. 149
Between Germany, Britain, France, and the US, Germany had the greatest national interest
in finding a solution to the Croatian problem: they, along with Austria, were very in close
geographical proximity to the conflict and were already beset by refugee problems. Then
too Germany had a large pool of Croatian foreign workers and was threatened with
internal security problems the longer the civil war lasted. 150 And although Germany did
not have the support of the its major allies, it had support from the minor members of the
EC.
German willingness to expend political capital on behalf of Croatia and Slovenia
underscored the historical ties between these two regions of Europe. But while critics
called this an obvious attempt by Germany to extend its sphere of influence back into
traditional areas, the Germans did not exploit their success in a manner that would support
this charge. Indeed, Foreign Minister Genscher used his influence with the Croatians to
148 Gerald Livingston, "Good Morning Germany", Per Spiegel. No. 4, 20 January 1992, trans. Eagle
Research Group, 4.
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bring the conflict to an EC peace conference, which would stress human rights, self-
determination, the rights of minorities, and the inviolability of borders. 151
In a broader sense, the German initiative in Yugoslavia was but a continuation of the
Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt. This process started with the purpose of reestablishing
relations with traditional German neighbors to the East, and it has developed now to the
point that German influence has been largely restored throughout Eastern Europe. 152 The
German interest in Eastern Europe is congruous with that of Europe: the maintenance of
stability in a troubled political landscape.
151 Jasper von Altenbockum, "Als ehrlicher Makler in Zagreb: AuEenminister Genscher zwischen




Will united Germany become a world power? Is it a revisionist state? Changes in the
global security system are inevitable as the European landscape continues its transformation
since 1989. German statecraft will be strongly affected by how these changes are perceived
and reacted to by Germany's allies and neighbors, whether it will stay firmly rooted in the
West with strong eastern policies, or whether it might take on an altogether new orientation.
The chances of a German power policy developing in Eastern Europe are slight. The
legacy of German Machtpolitik is too strong for adoption of any sort of unilateral approach
to future uses of military force, and even if forces are eventually authorized for deployment
out-of-area, it will most likely be under the mandate of either the United Nations or the
European Community. The often repeated fear of resurgent German militarism lies mainly
in the frettings of German leftists and old style West European and American nationalists,
who, though probably sincere in their convictions, have their own political agendas to follow
which requires a constant return to this theme. 153
Germany will most likely continue to be a revisionist power in terms of its expanding
influence in the east and its position within the European Community. This continuity
should be in accordance with the often repeated US desire for Germany to assume a greater
share of global responsibility and to shoulder more of the burdens of leadership. But
Germans are concerned that the implication of this sharing of leadership is that Germany
should shoulder more of the burden of US leadership instead of initiating its own leadership.
'-^ Rheinhard Rode, Germany: World Economic Power or Overburdened Eurohegemon?, Peace
Research Institute Frankfurt . No. 21,1990, 19
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This was clearly evidenced in the crisis in Yugoslavia, where the German initiative was
opposed by the United States.
With the demise of the Soviet threat, which gave the US-German relationship an
ironclad purpose, it is ever less likely that Germany will continue in its role as junior partner
to the US. The national interests of Germany and the US are diverging as the cold war
recedes and Germany concentrates on European issues, which in the cold war were global
issues and thus of vital interest to the United States, but which Washington now perceives as
more regional. German initiatives in Eastern Europe may run counter to US policy
preferences The divergence of the national interests between the two allies contains the
danger that, as new roles are developed, they could be perceived to be in opposition to one
another when evaluated in terms of the relationship of even a few years back. This means
that policy analysis has to be much more in depth and complete than before, because actions
that would have been unthinkable in the cold war are now not only possible but in some
cases necessary. By the same token, the absence of a clearly defined Soviet threat should not
be justification for postulating threats where none exist. An example of such assumptions is
in the area of both nuclear and conventional military power.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance 1992 illustrates the kind of thinking that
makes Germans uneasy with the US role. This document, while not officially adopted but
which has wide support, proposes that the US position as the only remaining superpower in
the world should be protected against encroachment by other countries. The republics of the
erstwhile Soviet Union are targeted primarily due to their latent power as resurgent nuclear
threats, but Germany and Japan are mentioned as potential rivals because they could develop
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nuclear capabilities. 154 This hegemonic concept of the new world order is very detrimental
to US relations not only with Germany, but most other countries in the world as well against
which such plans are directed.
From its founding in 1949 and through its rearmament and beyond, Germany has
repeatedly and vehemendy opposed the development of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction. The suggestion of such development would be politically destructive to
any party which forwarded it and support for such development is not found in any of the
German sources used in this thesis. On the contrary, the sources that do ascribe such
aspirations to the Germans are primarily American and illustrate the divergence of
understanding between the foreign policy elites of the two countries. The Pentagon study
serves as the primary example of this divergence, but academic circles also abound in this sort
of speculation, such as John Mearsheimers Back to the Future article. 1 5 5 In this 1990 article,
the controlled proliferation of nuclear weapons to Germany is endorsed as the most realistic
method of acknowledging German security requirements. While this may be rational and
make sense in an academic multipolar world model, it is divorced from the realities and
possibilities of Germans statecraft. There is no interest or support for developing nuclear
weapons or for that matter, to even keep nuclear weapons of its NATO allies on German
soil. 156
The point of this argument is not whether the Germans will need or want nuclear
weapons in the future, but that the perceived security needs of Germany varies so greatly
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between Berlin and Washington. Nuclear weapons only remotely affect the security
calculations of Germans, much less so than the more pressing problems ofeconomic
instability to the east, immigration control, and integral nationalism conflicts throughout
southeastern Europe. The Germans see no requirement for nuclear weapons for their security
posture, yet this attribute is assigned to them by Pentagon planners because nuclear weapons
are what Pentagon planners equate with national security. Strategic nuclear weapons play
such a large and important role in the US security equation that this requirement is
transferred to potential "rivals" and assumed for them, without due regard for their
circumstances or their security needs.
Conventional Force
The role of force in statecraft continues to cause divergence in US-German
understanding. The United States maintains a global military presence and is quick to
decisively use its military forces to further its national interests and those of its allies, be it in
Iraq, Panama, Libya, or any other number of spots around the globe. The German criticism
of this type of statecraft is that it does not promote any sort of stability or enduring order
after the military mission is accomplished. The predominance of an interventionist policy in
the statecraft of not only the US, but of other German allies as well, notably Britain and
France, runs counter to the German experience since 1945. As Germany assumes more
political responsibilities, its reluctance to use force in an interventionist role will undoubtedly
cause more friction with its allies.
The German left proposes a German non-interventionist model to counter the over-
exited antiquated world power politics model of Germany's allies, who have not had to suffer
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the consequences of their own power policies as the Germans have. 157 But the real question
that German politicians need to address is not if Germany should contribute to
multinational forces, but to what extent Germany can afford to become isolated
internationally in a scenario such as the GulfWar.
Stability
For the time being, German foreign policy interests are very much focused on Europe
and its attendant problems. The chaos and disorder to the east pose a grave security risk to
Germany not necessarily in military terms, but in equally important national security issues
of immigration control, economic upheaval, national borders, and integral nationalism.
German need for predictability and order will be as much of a goal in Eastern Europe as any
sort of influence which can be gained there with massive German economic assistance.
The German position on the front line during the cold war created a driving need for
order, stability, and control in its sphere of influence. But while the West German
government deferred to the US in critical foreign policy matters such as confrontations with
the Soviets, that relationship has changed with united Germany if for no other reason that
the United States in not willing to take the lead in relations to Eastern Europe. 158
Part of the problem in US-German relations is the frustration that the United States
feels as it sets Germany apparently reaping the benefits of the end of the cold war, a result
the US caused but the benefits of which it cannot reap. The US may have spent the Soviets
into history, but the massive budget deficits that were incurred as a result during the 1980's
157 Rode, 20.
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prohibit large scale economic assistance to Eastern Europe, assistance which is expected of a
world leader. Germany, on the other hand, is well situated to provide the assistance for the
economic and political transformations taking place, which gives them a large amount of
influence in Eastern Europe. 159 But despite their investments in Eastern Europe, Germany
will not be able to control this area and will have to live with its uncertainties and dangers.
In this respect, Germans feel that they have been left to fend for themselves in the quagmire
of Eastern European upheavals. 160
As Germany seeks stability in the East, it will have to continue to take the lead and open
itself to the criticism that any world power making decisive moves must endure. But these
moves have to be anticipated and not overreacted to by Germany's allies. They are a very
necessary and it does not appear that any other countries in the West are in a position to take
this leadership role.
The future of US-German relations will depend in large pan on how German policies in
the East are enacted and how they are perceived by the US. If Germany places its own
national interest above all else as France has done throughout the post war period, then the
German relationship with Washington could well resemble the unpredictable relationship
that Washington and Paris have had. If, on the other hand, German action is seen to
transcend narrow national interests and to assume greater responsibility for the European
order, the relationship could be much closer and would be comparable to Britain's special
relationship with the United States. 161
159 Ibid., 4.




The US has a continuing vital role to play in German and European security. In times
when isolationist rhetoric once again sweeps the country and the American role in Germany
and Europe becomes less clear, it is vital to the peace ofAmerica to keep in mind that, with
the end of the cold war, the specter of war in Europe is once again a grave issue of statecraft.
Europe, the source of most of the violent and destructive conflicts in the modern age, has not
yet reached Immanual Kant's state of eternal peace. Makers ofAmerican policy must find a
way to accommodate German power, not in the least because European security and peace
are not merely peripheral to American interests.
83
Book Bibliography
Abenheim, Donald. Reforging the Iron Cross. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1988.
Bartke, Mathias. Verteidigungsauftrag der Bundeswehr. Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1991.
Bergner, Jeffrey T. The New Superpowers. New York: St. Martins Press, 1991.
Catudal, Honore M. Soviet Nuclear Strategy fom Stalin to Gorbachev. Atlantic Highlands,
NJ: Humanities Press International, 1988.
Craig, Gordon A. Europe Since 1815. New York:The Drydon Press, 1974.
.
The Germans. New York: Penguin Books USA, Inc., 1983.
Gildea, Robert .Barricades and Borders: Europe 1800-1914. New York and London:
Oxford University Press, 1987.
Gordon, Lincoln . Ed. Eroding Empire: Western Relations with Eastern Europe. Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institute, 1987.
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. Arms Control, the ERG, and the Future ofEast-West Relationships.
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. Germany, America, Europe. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press, 1989.
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. Global Peace and Security. Boulder and London: Westview Press,
1987.
Hanrieder, Wolfram F. West German Foreign Policy: 1949-1979. Boulder . Colorado:
Westview Press, 1980.
Jacobsen, Hans-Adolph and Hans Dollinger. Deutschland: Hundert Jahre Deutsche
Geschichte. Munich, West Germany: Kurt Desch Verlag, 1969.
Kaplan, Lawrence S. American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance. Kent, Ohio: Kent State
University Press, 1991.
..
NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance. Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1988.
84
Kennan, George. The Decline ofBismarcks European Order: Franco Prussian Relations 1875-
1890. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.
Kaufman, Daniel J., David S. Clark, and Kevin P. Sheehan. US National Securityfor the
1990s. Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1991.
Kelleher, Catherine Mc Ardle . Germany and the Politics ofNuclear Weapons . New York
and London: Columbia University Press, 1975.
Shirer, William. The Rise and Fall ofthe Third Reich. Simon & Schuster: New York,
1990.
Stuart, Douglas and William Tow. The Limits ofAlliance. Baltimore and London: The
John Hopkins University Press, 1990.
Taylor, A.J. P. 77?^ Struggle for Mastery in Europe. New York and London: Oxford
University Press, 1954.
85
Speeches and Journal Bibliography
Abenheim, Donald. Potsdam and the Maintenance of Tradition: An American View.
Unpublished MS, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. February,
1992.
Andrejevich, Milan. Yugoslavia: Things Fall Apart?. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
Vol. VIII. No. 5. 1 November 1990.
Yugoslavia: The Gathering Storm. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Vol. VIII.
No. 20. 15 February 1991.
Armour, Donald, Germany I: how unity came. The World Today. Vol 47. No. 2.
February 1991.
Arnold, Hans. The Gulf Crisis and the United Nations. Aussenpolitik. Second Quarter
1991.
Arnold, Eckard. German Foreign Policy and Unification. Global Affairs. Summer 1991.
Asmus, Ronald D. Germany in Transition: National SelfConfidence and International
Reticence. Statement before the House Sub-Committee on Europe and the Middle
East. Rand Corp. February 1992.
Atzinger, Oberst i.G. Hans-Georg. Emerging German Security Policy: The Dispute on 'Out
ofArea' Employments. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. 10 March
1992.
Bartke, Mathias. Die Trennung zwischen Biindnissfall und Verteidigungsauftrag. Frieden und
Abriistung. No. 1. 1991.
Beckler, Winifried. Parteien zur deutschen Frage 1945 bis 1990. Zeitscgrift zur politischen
Bildung und Information. Second Quarter 1990.
Beschlufie der EG-Aufienminister zur Anerkennung Neuer Staaten. Bulletin. No. 144. 19
December 1991.
t
Binnendjek, Hans. What Kind ofNew Order for Europe?. The World Today, February
1991.
Bredow, Wilfried von and Thomas Jager. Die Aufenpolitik Deutschlands. Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte. 4 January 1991.
Brown, Ursula. Epicentre Kuwait: The International Dimension ofa Regional Conflict.
Aussenpolitik. First Quarter 1991.
86
Bruns, Wilhelm. Deutschlands Suche nach einer neuen aufienpolitischen Rolle. Deutschland
Archiv. July 1991.
Buchbender, Orrwin. Sicherheitspolitik und bjfentliche Meinung in Deutschland. German
American Security Relations and the New European Architecture. Consortium for
Atlantic Studies, Arizona State University. 3-6 October 1991.
Crow, Suzanne. Moscow Opposes Foreign Interference in Yugoslav Crisis, Backs Unified State.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Research Institute. Vol. VIII. No. 8. 10 August
1991.
Eekelen, Willem F. The Changing Nature of Transatlantic Relations. European Strategy
Group (of the WEU). 1991.
Eberle, Sir James. The Security Interests of Western Europe. The World Today. Vol 47.
No 2. February 1991.
Erklarung des Aufienministers. James A. Baker und des Bundesministers des Auswdrtigen
Hans-Dietrich Genscher vom 2. Oktober 1991. German Embassy Press Release.
October 1991.
Gansel, Norbert. Deutsche Truppen unter UNO-Kommando?. Frieden und Abriistung. No.
1. 1991.
Gauger, Jorg-Dieter. Die Deutsche Frage ah Bildungsaufirag.Zehschrift zur politischen
Bildung und Information. Second Quarter 1990.
Genscher, Hanz-Dietrich. Eine Vision fur das ganze Europa. Bulletin. No. 14. 6 February
1991.
Erklarung des Aufien ministers zur Anerkennung neuer Staaten. Bulletin. No.
144. 19 December 1991.
.. The Future ofEurope. Speech in the Palcio das Necessidades. Lisbon. 12 July
1991.
.
Speech to the Foreign Relations Committee of the French National Assembly
in Paris, 19 November 1991. Statements and Speeches, German Information Center.
Vol. XIV. No. 12.
German Perspectives on NATO and European Security. National Security Research
,Inc.:Fairfax, VA. Prepared for the Defense Nuclear Agency. August 1991.
Healey, Dennis. ' Pax Americana' is a Dangerous Illusion. European Affairs. No.4.
August/September 1991.
87
Heilbrunn, Jacob. Germany and the Cold War: An Inquest. Global Affairs. Spring 1991.
Hellmann, Gunther. Der Krieg um Kuwait: Katalysator enier neuen Weltordnung" oder
Vorbote neuer Konflicte?. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 8 February 1991.
Hennig, Dr. Ottfried. Aspekte deutscher Sicherheitspolitik und Zukunftsaufgaben der
Bundeswehr. Bulletin. No. 140. 10 December 1991.
Hoppe, Thomas, Bericht fiber die Arbeitsgruppe Universelle Werte und ihre politischen
Konsequenzen. Wiener Blatter zur Friedensforschung. No. 65. December 1990.
Hubel, Helmut. Die Machte im Nahen Osten und der zweite Golfkrieg. Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte.
James, Harold. Germans and their Nation. German History: The Journal of the German
History Society. Vol. 9. No. 2. 1991.
Kielinger, Thomas. The Gulf War and the Consequences from a German Point of View.
Aussenpolitik. Second Quarter 1991.
Klein, Paul. Griinzeug mit Blauhelm: Beteiligung der Bunderswehr an UNO-Einsatzen.
Information fur die Truppen. June 1991.
Kohl, Helmut. The Agenda ofGerman Politics for the Nineties. Speech given at Washington,
DC. May 20, 1991. Statements and Speeches, German Information Center. Vol.
XIV. No. 5. 6 June 1991.
.. Aufgaben deutscher Politik in den Neunziger Jahren. Bulletin. No. 56. 22 May
1991.
.. Botschaft zur gemeinsamen europaischen Aufien- und Sicherheitspolitik. Bulletin.
No. 117. 18 October 1991.
.. Herausforderungen und Prioritdten der Politik der Bundesregierungfur 1992.
Bulletin. No. 5. 14 January 1992.
.
Opening Speech at the CSCE Conference ofForeign Ministers in Berlin.
Statements and Speeches, German Information Center. Vol. XIV. No. 6. June 19/20
1991.
. Situation and Developments in Yugoslavia. Speech given in the German
Bundestag. 4 September 1991.
.
Erkldrung des Bundeskanzlers zur Anerkennung neuer Staaten. Bulletin. No.
144. 19 December 1991.
88
Kolbe, Dr. D. Die Zulassigkeit der Beteiligung der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der UNO-
Friedenstruppen. Deutscher Bundestag Wissentschaftliche Dienste. No. 114/89. 30
August 1989.
Krell, Gert. Ostpolitik Dimensions of West German Security Policy. Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt. No. 1. 1990.
.
Searchingfor Peace after the Cold War. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt. No.
19-20. 1990.
Langguth, Gerd. Germany, the EC and the Architecture ofEurope. The German Question in
the Context ofthe EC. Aussenpolitik. Second Quarter 1991.
Leighton, Marian. Towards a Common European Home: What's in itfor us?. Global Affairs.
Spring 1991.
Lendavi. Paul. The Balkan Bind. European Affairs. No. 3. June/July 1991.
Link, Jiirgen. Einige Lehren aus dem bisherigen Verlaufder 'Golfkrise'. Frieden und
Abrustung. No. 1. 1991.
.
No Germans to the Front. Frieden und Abrustung. No. 1. 1991.
Livingston, Robert Gerald. Good Morning Germany. Der Spiegel, trans, by the Eagle
Research Group. Vol. 4. 20 January 1992.
Markovits, Andrei and Simon Reich. Should Europe Fear the Germans. German Politics
and Society. Issue 23. Summer 1991.
Mearsheimer, John J. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War.
International Security. Vol 15. No.l. Summer 1990.
Nassauer, Otfried and Erich Schmidt-Eenboom. Streitkrafte des geeinten Deutschland.
Frieden und Abrustung. No. 1. 1991.
Ein Neuer Rivaled Der Spiegel. No. 12. 16 March 1992.
Notzold, Jiirgen and Reinhard Rummel . On the Way to a New European Order
Aussenpolitik. Third Quarter 1990.
Petkovic, Ranko. Yugoslavia versus Yugoslavia. European Affairs. Vol 1/91. February/March
1991.
Prause, Oberst i.G. Jens. The Role ofthe Bundeswehr in a Changing Security Environment.
German American Security Relations and the New European Architecture.
Consortium for Atlantic Studies, Arizona State University. 3-6 October 1991.
89
Ramet, Sabrina. The Breakup of Yugoslavia. Global Affairs. Spring 1991.
Reuter, Jens. Jugoslavien im Umbruch. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 2 November 1990.
Rittberger, Volker. Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland- eine Weltmacht? Aus Politik und
Zeitgeschichte. 15 January 1990.
Rode, Reinhard. Germany: World Economic Power or Overburdened Hegemon?. Peace
Research Institute. Frankfurt. No. 21. 1990.
Sommer, Theo. Germany United, but not a World Power. European Affairs.
February/March 1991. No. 2.
Schmahling, Elmar. Aufrufan die Soldaten und Reservisten der Bundeswehr sowie alle
wehrphlichtigen Burger. Unpublished circular of retired fleet admiral Schmahling to
soldiers of the Bundeswehr.
Staack, Michael. Die Aufenpolitik der Bundesrepublik aufdem Weg in ein neues Europa.
Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 15 January 1990.
Stoltenberg, Richard. Ethish verantwortbare Politik kann nicht ohne Macht auskommen.
Beitrage zur Konflict Forschung. Second Quarter 1990.
Tenfelds, Klaus. 1914-1990: Einheit der Epoche. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 27
Septemberl991.
Thies, Jochen. German Unification: Opportunity or Setback for Europe?. The World Today.
Vol 47. No 1. January 1991.
.
Germany: tests ofcredibility. The World Today. Vol 47. No 6. June 1991.
Tibi, Bassam. Der Irak und der Golfkrieg. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. 8 February
1991.
Die irakische Kuwait-Invasion ung die Golfkrise: Regionale Faktoren eines
internationalisierten Konflikts. Beitrage zur Konflikt Forschung. Fourth Quarter 1990.
Tibi, Bassam. Die irakische Kuwait-Invasion und die Golfkrise: Regionale Faktoren eines
internationalen Konflicts. Beitrage zur Konflict Forschung. 4th Quarter 1990.
Scheer, Hermann. Warnung vor einem militarpolitischen Absolutismus. Frieden und
Abrustung. No. 1. 1991.
Stiegler, Ludwig. SPD: Konflikttregungsfahigkeit, nicht Gewaltfdhigkeit der UNO steigern.
Frieden und Abrustung. No. 1. 1991.
90
Sommer, Theo. Germany: United But Not a World Power. European Affairs.
February/March 1991.
Weizacker, Richard von. Aufgaben der gesamtdeutschen Bundeswehr in einer demokratiscben
Gesellschafi. Speech of the President of the Federal Republic in Potsdam. Press and
Information Service of the Federal Government. No. 46. 7 May 1991.
.
Opening Speech at the CSCE Conference ofForeign Ministers in Berlin.
Statements and Speeches, German Information Center. Vol. XIV. No. 6. June 19/20
1991.
Winkler, Heinrich August. Nationalisms, Nationalstaat und nationale Frage in Deutschland
seit 1945. Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Vol. 49. 27 September 1991.
Van Orden, Geoffrey. The Bundeswehr in Transition. Survival. Vol 33. No 4. July/August
1991.
Vogel, Bernhard. Foderalismus in Deutschland und Europa. Zeitschrift zur politischen
Bildungund Information. Fourth Quarter 1990.




Altenbockum, Jasper von. "Als ehrlicher Makler in Zagreb: Aufienminister Genscher
zwischen Kroaten und Serben". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 26 February 1992.
"Geschichten, die von Hafi und Rache handeln". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
28 February 1992.
Arnold, Hans. "Blauhelme und sonst nichts: Das Grundgesetz erlaubt Einsatze im UN-
Kollektiv". Die Zeit. 12 April 1991.
Bertram, Christoph. "Wo nicht hin mit der Bundeswehr?". Die Zeit. 31 May 1991.
Binder, David. "US is Worried by Bonn's Assertiveness". The New York Times. 7 January
1992.
"Brandt: Bundeswehreinheiten fur UN". Westfalische Rundschau. 25 April 1991.
"Bruchige Waffenstillstand in Kroatien: Sicherheits berat iiber Jugoslawien". Die Zeit. 3
October 1991.
"Bundeswehr streitet iiber deutsche Kampfeinsatze. Die Welt. 17 January 1992. in
Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik. February 1992.
Deiseroth, Dieter. "Was die Juristen zu den "Blauhelmen Sagen". Frankfurter Rundschau.
No. 143. 24 June 1991.
"Die FDP befurfortet Kampfeinsatze", Frankfurter Allgemeine. 27 May 1991.
Diner, Dan. "Warum der Umweg iiber Bagdad". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 1
1
February 1992.
Dolzer, Rudolph. "Formen der Friedensversicherung". Frankfurter Allgemeine, 27 May 1991.
Donhoff, Marion Grafin von. "The New Germany Has Not Forgotten America's Role in
Europe Since the War". The German Tribune. 16 December 1990.
.
"Ziigel Aufhehmen: Ganz Europa bedarf die Fuhrung". Die Zeit. 21 November
1990.
Feldmeyer, Karl. "Die verunsicherten Sieger". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 11 February
1992.
"Wenig Zeit filr ain grofies Programm". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 7
November 1991.
92
Fisher, Heinz-Joachim. "Triumphe in Rom beim NATO-Treffen nicht gefeiert". Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung. 8 November 1991.
Fisher, Marc. "New Line on Europe: They See Rising Friction Over NATO and Trade as
Isolation Grows". The International Herlad Tribune. 10 February 1992.
..
"One Germany, Still Divided Over Its Military Role". International Herlad
Tribune. 29 February 1992.
Forster, Michael. The Disintegration of a Nation as Tito's Handiwork Comes Apart". The
German Tribune. 24 February 1991.
Gelb, Leslie. "Tommorrows Germany". The New York Times. 22 December 1991.
Gellman, Barton. "US Commanders see New Challenge: Slowing Retreat from Europe".
Washington Post. 15 October 1991.
Genrich, Claus von. Das europaisch-adantische Geflecht. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 17
October 1991.
Gillessen, Giinther. "Spannungen um das neue Armeekorps". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
8 November 1991.
"Groftbritannien halt seine Bedenkung aufrecht". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 30
October 1991.
Hoagland, Jim. "Germany's New Export to Europe: Stability". Washington Post. 20 February
1992.
Joffe, Josef. "America's in the Balcony as Europe Takes Center Stage". The New York Times.
27 December 1991.
.
"Keine Anzeichen von Anti-Amerikanismus in Deutschland". Siiddeutsche
Zeitung. 4 February 1992.
"Kein Einvernehmen iiber die ktinftige Rolle der WEU". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.30
October 1991.
"Keine Beteiligung an Kampfeinsatzen: Der Besclufi des SPD-Parteitags zu Blauhelmen im
Wordauf. Siiddeutsche Zeitung 1 June 1991.
Kinzer, Stephen. "Germany Jostles Post-Soviet Europe". The New York Times. 27 December
1991.
.
"New Leaders Vie to Succeed Kohl". The New York Times. 15 December 1991.
93
Koar, Jiirgen. "Now Europe needs to Clarify Its Position". The German Tribune. 24 March
1991.
"Kohl antwortet im Bundestag auf Bedenken und Fragen der NATO-Partner". Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung.7 November 1991.
Kremp, Herbert. "Europe's Three Lessons from the GulfWar". The German Tribune. 3
March 1991.
Kroter, Thomas. "Der Weg iiber die Eselbrucke". Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt. No. 8.
8 March 1991.
"Lamers: Deutsche Verantwortung wachst". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 5 November
1991.
Leicht, Robert. "Europas jugoslawische Zwickmiihle". Die Zeit. No. 38. 20 September 1991.
.
"Mord und Totschlag". Die Zeit. Nr. 49. 6 December 1991.
Lewis, Paul. "UN Yields to Plan by Germany to Recognize Yugoslav Republics". The New
York Times. 16 December 1991.
Lind, Michael. "Recognize the Power of the New Germany". The New York Times. 27
December 1991.
Riding, Alan. "At East-West Crossroads, Western Europe Hesitates". The New York Times.
25 March 1992.
Schroder, Dieter."EC bid to Bring Yugoslavia Back from the Brink". The German Tribune. 4
August 1991.
"EC Foreign Ministers Try to Reach Some Accord". The German Tribune. 17
February 1991.
Schueler, Hans. "Kein Kampf um Kuwait". Die Zeit. 18 January 1991.
Schwartz, Hans-Peter, "Handlungsunfahig in Ubersee". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 15
January 1992.
Schwartz, Karl-Peter. "KSZE dehnt sich nach Asien aus". Die Zeit. 30 January 1992.
"Slowenien Wesit den Weg nach vorn". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 28 February 1992.
Sommer, Theo. "Unser nunmehr fertiges Vaterland". Die ZeitAO December 1990.
"Was Geht uns schon Jugoslawien an?". Die Zeit. No. 21. 24 May 1991.
94
Sturmer, Michael. "Alliances Are Not to be Had Free of Charge". The German Tribune, 9
June 1991.
Tagliabue, John. "Germany Adamant It Will Recognize Yogoslav States". The New York
Times. 1 5 December 1991.
.
"The New Germans: Dwarfs No More". The New York Times. 16 December
1991.
Thies, Jochen. "Of German Nationalism". International Herlad Tribune. 8 February 1992.
"Union will die NATO-Strategie andern". Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. 17 October 1991
Weidenfeld, Werner. "The Swiftly Changing Nature of Ties Between America and
Germany". The German Tribune. 5 May 1991.
Wiedeman, Giinther. "Endlich fur Klarheit sorgen". Kblner Stadtanzeiger. 17 January 1992.
in Informationen zur Sicherheitspolitik. February 1992.
Whitney, Craig. "NATO, Victim of Success, Searches for New Strategy". The New York
Times. 26 October 1991.




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5100
3. OP-614, The Pentagon, Room 4E483 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
4. OP-607, The Pentagon, Room 4D563 1
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, D.C. 20350
5. Dr. Thomas Bruneau 1
Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Bn)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943








8. Lt. Victor Malone 4
Naval Submarine School
Code 80 SOAC Class 92050
Groton, CT 06349-5700
96
9. European Division/NATO Ploicy Branch
J-5 PNT Room 20965
Joint Staff
Washington, D.C. 20301











NAVAL P: ' V^scHrtm
GAYLORDS T ^1^ ^\"
3

